



Global Policy Dialogue

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From Commitments to Implementation: The Legacy of COP30 and Pathways to Strengthening Global Climate Governance





EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Global Policy Dialogue 2026 “*From Commitments to Implementation: the Legacy of COP30 and Pathways to Strengthening Global Climate Governance*,” examined the emerging challenges of translating climate commitments into implementation following COP30. Participants broadly agreed that COP30 marked an important evolution in climate governance, shifting the focus from negotiating new commitments toward accelerating the delivery of existing ones through new implementation mechanisms, including the Global Implementation Accelerator (GIA), the Belém Mission to 1.5, the reformed Action Agenda, the Just Transition Mechanism (JTM) and the COP30 Roadmaps. Central to this approach was the idea that implementation efforts should seek to generate positive tipping points capable of accelerating systemic change at scale rather than relying solely on incremental progress.

At the same time, discussions highlighted that implementation remains constrained less by the absence of solutions than by fragmentation across institutions, sectors and levels of government. Climate, trade, finance, development and digital governance continue to operate through largely separate systems despite their growing interdependence. Strengthening coordination across these domains emerged as one of the central governance challenges of the coming decade.

Participants welcomed the COP30 Presidency’s concept of two-tier

multilateralism, combining consensus-based negotiations with complementary implementation-oriented processes. However, they emphasized that voluntary initiatives must reinforce rather than replace the UNFCCC negotiating process. The long-term effectiveness of the COP30 legacy will depend on whether future presidencies can sustain political momentum and further institutionalize key innovations introduced in Belém.

Discussions also highlighted the strategic role of the COP30 Roadmaps as voluntary implementation frameworks capable of translating broad political commitments into practical action. Participants emphasized that their long-term credibility will depend on the incorporation of clear governance arrangements, measurable milestones and accountability mechanisms capable of monitoring progress while remaining sufficiently flexible to accommodate diverse national circumstances.

The Dialogue also underscored the importance of inclusion and territorial implementation. Indigenous peoples, Afro-descendant communities, local governments and other actors operating closest to implementation were increasingly recognized not merely as beneficiaries of climate action, but as essential partners in delivering it. Strengthening multilevel governance, improving access to finance and expanding participation in decision-making were identified as priorities across multiple themes.

A recurring conclusion throughout the Dialogue was that climate implementation cannot be separated from broader questions of economic development. Discussions highlighted the need to align climate objectives

with trade, finance and development strategies, strengthen public investment and industrial policy, and ensure that the benefits of the transition are shared more equitably across countries and communities.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS


The following recommendations are condensed from the more detailed recommendations presented throughout the report. They are grouped by theme and should be considered alongside the corresponding sections for full context.

COP30'S LEGACY AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTINUITY

- ▲ Strengthen the continuity, effectiveness and progressive institutionalization of the Global Implementation Accelerator (GIA), the Belém Mission to 1.5 and the reformed Global Climate Action Agenda across future COP cycles.
- ▲ Prioritize climate initiatives capable of generating positive tipping points across sectors, technologies and institutions to accelerate systemic change.
- ▲ Develop implementation pathways that address fiscal, institutional and administrative barriers preventing climate finance from reaching vulnerable communities, territories and subnational governments.

CLIMATE GOVERNANCE REFORM

- ▲ Promote complementary implementation-oriented cooperation while preserving the centrality of the UNFCCC negotiating process.
- ▲ Improve coordination across UNFCCC workstreams to reduce duplication and strengthen coherence across the climate regime.
- ▲ Strengthen transparency regarding institutional affiliations and stakeholder participation at COPs to improve accountability and trust.
- ▲ Expand the engagement of finance ministries in climate governance to better align climate commitments with economic and fiscal policy.



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- ▲ Use emerging international legal guidance, including the ICJ Advisory Opinion, to strengthen domestic climate legislation, emissions targets, adaptation planning, reporting systems and institutional accountability.

THE COP30 ROADMAPS

- ▲ Incorporate reporting and accountability frameworks with measurable milestones into the design of the Fossil Fuels and Deforestation Roadmaps.
- ▲ Build the political support and technical foundations necessary to anchor the Fossil Fuels Roadmap in the second Global Stocktake, while strengthening its connection with the Global Climate Action Agenda and national transition roadmaps.
- ▲ Integrate the Roadmaps into national development, investment and sectoral planning processes, adapted to local circumstances and involving relevant ministries, subnational governments, business and civil society.
- ▲ Promote national fossil fuel transition roadmaps through coordinated, whole-of-government processes, while also supporting the development of a global roadmap and related international cooperation processes.
- ▲ Position the Deforestation Roadmap as a coordination mechanism to align forest, biodiversity, climate, food security and development initiatives around the objective of halting and reversing deforestation by 2030.
- ▲ Strengthen coordination and synergies between the Deforestation and Fossil Fuels Roadmaps to address interconnected challenges related to land use, energy and food security.

THE ACTION AGENDA

- ▲ Establish a parliamentary forum within the Action Agenda to connect legislators with coalitions and implementation initiatives.
- ▲ Embed multilevel governance mechanisms linking national climate commitments to implementation by states, provinces and municipalities.
- ▲ Strengthen transparency, accountability and reporting systems to reduce greenwashing and demonstrate measurable implementation outcomes.

- ▲ Expand the leadership roles and effective participation of Global South actors, Indigenous peoples, Afro-descendant communities and local stakeholders within climate governance processes.
- ▲ Protect environmental defenders by addressing the links between environmental crime, territorial governance and climate implementation.

JUST TRANSITION MECHANISM

- ▲ Ensure that the Just Transition Mechanism recognizes and supports communities and territories already generating climate benefits through forest conservation, biodiversity protection and sustainable resource management.
- ▲ Incorporate territorial eligibility criteria into the Just Transition Mechanism so that Indigenous peoples, local communities and subnational governments can access support directly.
- ▲ Sustain and deepen the engagement of Afro-descendant peoples, Indigenous peoples and other historically underrepresented constituencies, ensuring that recognition achieved at COP30 translates into participation, leadership and access to resources.

GLOBAL GOAL ON ADAPTATION

- ▲ Advance the methodologies, data frameworks and national information systems needed to make Global Goal on Adaptation indicators comparable across countries and capable of supporting monitoring, finance allocation and results-based reporting.
- ▲ Treat adaptation as a cross-cutting, multi-ministerial and multilevel responsibility, ensuring that climate-specific and broader development financing integrate adaptation into planning, investment and implementation decisions.
- ▲ Strengthen synergies between adaptation, mitigation and loss and damage, while ensuring that climate action prioritizes and protects populations facing the highest levels of climate vulnerability.





BREAKING DOWN SILOS: CLIMATE, TRADE AND FINANCE

- ▲ Use the Integrated Forum on Climate Change and Trade as a bridge between climate and trade regimes, promoting technical exchange and convergence on carbon accounting methodologies, green taxonomies, standards and certification frameworks.
- ▲ Ensure that climate-related trade measures remain compatible with development objectives and equitable participation in international markets, avoiding disguised forms of protectionism and unnecessary barriers to trade.
- ▲ Ensure early and meaningful private-sector engagement in climate-trade coordination, including small and medium-sized enterprises.
- ▲ Use public policy tools, such as industrial policy, public procurement, domestic sourcing measures and support for local and regional production, to help developing countries capture greater value from the green transition, strengthen domestic technological capabilities and avoid new forms of dependency within global value chains.
- ▲ Align digital and climate policy frameworks to address the emissions impacts of artificial intelligence and digital infrastructure, while ensuring that digitalization supports equitable and low-carbon development pathways rather than reinforcing existing asymmetries.
- ▲ Pursue international tax cooperation mechanisms, including within the scope of the proposed UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation, to expand the fiscal space available for sustainable development financing.
- ▲ Strengthen public finance, fiscal capacity and long-term industrial strategies as central pillars of the climate transition, while mobilizing private capital in ways that complement and reinforce public investment.


Acronym / Term	Full Name
ACTO	Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization
BICFIT	Baku Initiative for Climate Finance, Investment and Trade
CBAM	Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism
CBD	Convention on Biological Diversity
CDR	Carbon Dioxide Removal
CHAMP	Coalition for High Ambition Multilevel Partnerships
COP	Conference of the Parties
COP21	21st Conference of the Parties, Paris, France (2015)
COP30	30th Conference of the Parties, Belém, Brazil (2025)
COP31	31st Conference of the Parties, Antalya, Türkiye (2026)
COP32	32nd Conference of the Parties, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (2027)
Deforestation Roadmap	COP30 Roadmap on Halting and Reversing Deforestation and Forest Degradation by 2030
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
Fossil Fuels Roadmap	COP30 Roadmap on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels in a Just, Orderly and Equitable Manner
GAP	Belém Gender Action Plan
GGA	Global Goal on Adaptation
GIA	Global Implementation Accelerator
GST	Global Stocktake
IACtHR	Inter-American Court of Human Rights
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IEA	International Energy Agency
IFCCT	Integrated Forum on Climate Change and Trade
IMO	International Maritime Organization
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
JTM	Just Transition Mechanism
JTWP	Just Transition Work Programme
MMA	Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change of Brazil
NAP	National Adaptation Plan
NDC	Nationally Determined Contribution
PAS	Plans to Accelerate Solutions
TAFF	Transition Away from Fossil Fuels
TFFF	Tropical Forests Forever Facility
UNCCD	United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNFF	United Nations Forum on Forests
WTO	World Trade Organization



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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND

The years following COP30 represent a critical juncture for global climate governance. Held in Belém, Brazil, in November 2025, COP30 sought to position implementation at the center of international climate cooperation. A package of decisions was adopted by consensus despite a highly challenging geopolitical context, including the withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Agreement.

The Brazilian Presidency secured a set of landmark agreements on the formal negotiating track. The **Mutirão Decision** (named after the Brazilian concept of collective mobilization, with roots in Indigenous Tupi-Guaraní culture) established the **Global Implementation Accelerator** (GIA) and the **Belém Mission to 1.5**, introducing a formal multilateral mandate to accelerate implementation across governments and non-state actors. Brazil also initiated a substantial reform of the **Global Climate Action Agenda**, structured around six thematic axes aligned with the **Global Stocktake** (GST) and anchored by concrete **Plans to Accelerate Solutions** (PAS) developed by coalitions of states, subnational governments, businesses, civil society and international institutions.¹

Under the **Just Transition Work Programme** (JTWP), parties agreed to the Just Transition Mechanism (JTM), a new institutional home within the UNFCCC to advance just transitions, combining the most ambitious and comprehensive language on rights and inclusion ever adopted in a UN climate decision. In addition, the **Belém Gender Action Plan** (GAP) was established with the purpose of advancing gender-responsive climate action across the implementation of the Convention. Parties also committed to tripling adaptation finance by 2035, acknowledged the **Baku to Belém Roadmap** to scale up climate finance to US\$1.3 trillion annually by 2035 and decided to urgently advance efforts to achieve this goal, from both public and private sources.

To support its broader implementation agenda, the Presidency introduced a set of institutional innovations designed to bring the climate process closer to the people most affected by climate change and to actors beyond national governments. These include the creation of technical advisory councils on topics such as technological innovation and artificial intelligence, economy, science and adaptation, alongside a network

1. To see the Belém Political Package of decisions, see: <https://unfccc.int/cop30/belem-political-package>

of regional and sectoral Special Envoys who serve to channel information, demands and perspectives across priority regions and constituencies, such as business, unions, women and subnational governments. Additionally, four mobilization mechanisms were established to operate alongside formal negotiations to strengthen the effectiveness of the UNFCCC process and accelerate climate action, including the **People's Circle**, the **Global Ethical Stocktake**, the **Finance Circle** and the **COP Presidents' Circle**.

The COP30 Presidency **Roadmap for Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels in a Just, Orderly and Equitable Manner** (the Fossil Fuels Roadmap) and the **Roadmap for Halting and Reversing Deforestation and Forest Degradation by 2030** (the Deforestation Roadmap) occupy a politically significant position within the COP30 legacy. Both were proposed by the President of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, at the COP30 Leaders' Summit and received broad political support from participating countries. However, they were ultimately not incorporated into the negotiated outcomes of COP30. As a result, COP30 President André Corrêa do Lago announced that both initiatives would be advanced as voluntary processes outside the formal negotiating track of the UNFCCC. In parallel, Colombia and the Netherlands jointly announced that they would co-host a dedicated international conference on transitioning away from fossil fuels, which was convened in Santa

Marta, Colombia, in April 2026. Together, these initiatives signalled an emerging vision of climate governance based on the concept of two-tier multilateralism, which seeks to preserve the legitimacy of consensus-based decision-making while creating additional pathways for implementation and cooperation beyond the formal negotiating process.² At the same time, the voluntary nature of the Roadmaps has intensified debate about whether the implementation gaps they are designed to address can be closed through voluntary processes alone, or whether more binding or institutionalized arrangements will ultimately be required, including discussions surrounding a legally binding **Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty**.

These achievements, however significant, also expose structural tensions that the international community has yet to resolve. The institutional innovations of COP30 are not self-perpetuating; they require active stewardship across successive presidencies. At the same time, climate governance continues to face structural challenges critical to climate action, including trade, finance, biodiversity and desertification, which remain governed through separate institutional processes with limited coordination, weak policy coherence and implementation mechanisms.

In response, proposals for reforming global governance have gained increasing prominence. These include the creation of a **United Nations Climate**

2. For further information on the concept of two-tier multilateralism, see: COP30. *Twelfth Letter of the COP30 President*. January 27, 2026. Available at: <https://cop30.br/en/brazilian-presidency/letters-from-the-president/twelfth-letter-from-the-president>

Change Council and the **Integrated Forum on Climate Change and Trade** (IFCCT), announced at the COP30 Leaders' Summit and intended to bring together stakeholders from institutions such as the UNFCCC, the World Trade Organization (WTO), UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). This reflects a growing interest in institutional arrangements capable of improving coordination across governance regimes and strengthening the participation of non-state actors, subnational governments and financial institutions.

It is against this backdrop that the Global Policy Dialogue *“From Commitments to Implementation: the Legacy of COP30 and Pathways to Strengthen Global Climate Governance”* was convened in Salvador, Bahia, to provide a space for exchange and collective problem-solving on the future of climate governance and implementation.

Building on previous editions of the Dialogue,³ the 2026 gathering sought to examine how the international community can sustain momentum beyond annual climate negotiations and strengthen mechanisms capable of accelerating implementation across different levels of governance. Particular attention was given to the legacy of COP30 and emerging approaches to climate cooperation beyond traditional negotiation frameworks.

The Dialogue was held in Salvador, Bahia, Brazil, on May 25-26, 2026, organized by Plataforma CIPÓ, in partnership with the Government of the State of Bahia and the Interstate Consortium for the Sustainable Development of the Northeast, with the support of the Institute for Climate and Society (iCS), the Climate Emergency Collaboration Group, the Global Challenges Foundation, the Embassy of France in Brazil, the Heinrich Böll Foundation and the Global Governance Innovation Network, with the objective of:

- ▲ Promoting an assessment of the legacy of COP30, with an emphasis on the institutional innovations and mobilization cycles introduced, examining their effectiveness, the feasibility of their continuation under future COP presidencies, and pathways for their strengthening, with a view to contributing to the consolidation of a UNFCCC that advances a two-tier multilateralism combining consensus-based legitimacy with complementary implementation mechanisms;

3. For reports from previous Global Policy Dialogue editions, see: Recife, 2023: [“Global Policy Dialogue: Addressing the Triple Planetary Crisis through Improved Global Governance”](#); Rio de Janeiro, 2024: [“Global South Policy Dialogue: Promoting Climate Action and Tackling Inequalities: the role of the G20”](#); Vitória, 2025: [“Global Policy Dialogue: Promoting Climate Finance and Just Transitions in the Lead-Up to COP30”](#).

- ▲ Contributing technical inputs to the advancement of ongoing processes, both within and beyond the negotiating agenda, including the Just Transition Mechanism, the Global Implementation Accelerator and the Roadmaps for the Transition Away from Fossil Fuels in a Just, Orderly and Equitable Manner and for Halting and Reversing Deforestation and Forest Degradation by 2030;
- ▲ Identifying and assessing initiatives and proposals for global governance reform – such as the proposed United Nations Climate Change Council and the Integrated Forum on Climate Change and Trade – capable of enhancing coherence and effectiveness across the trade, finance and climate regimes, as well as enhancing the quality, transparency and coherence of the engagement of non-State actors, including subnational governments and financial institutions.

The event brought together participants from 20 countries,⁴ including representatives of national governments from ministries of environment and climate change, Indigenous Peoples, foreign affairs and finance, the COP30 Presidency, the upcoming COP31 Presidency of Türkiye and the COP32 Presidency of Ethiopia, subnational

governments and coalitions, international organizations, civil society, academia, think tanks and youth movements. The participation of the COP31 and COP32 host countries was particularly significant, reflecting the importance of engagement by future and former COP presidencies in shaping the next phase of the climate agenda.

4. South Africa, Germany, Australia, the Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Spain, Ethiopia, France, India, Lebanon, Malawi, Panama, Peru and Türkiye. For the full participant list, see Annex 1.

1.2 METHODOLOGY

The Global Policy Dialogue 2026 focused on the evolving architecture of global climate governance in the aftermath of COP30 and in the lead-up to COP31 and COP32. To explore these themes, the Dialogue combined high-level thematic sessions, parallel breakout group discussions,⁵ in addition to a closed-

door session on the COP30 Roadmaps to explore opportunities, challenges and next steps for advancing their implementation.⁶

The five thematic sessions featured special addresses and interventions from participants, addressing the following themes:

1. Taking Stock of COP30: Reflections from the Presidency
2. From Commitments to Implementation: The Legacy of COP30
3. Reforming Climate Governance Toward a Two-Tier Multilateralism
4. The Road Ahead: Strategies and Priorities for COP31, COP32 and the Future of Climate Multilateralism
5. A New Economy for the Climate: Breaking Down Silos Across Climate, Finance and Trade

Participants also engaged in multiple rounds of breakout discussions, which provided a space for more in-depth and technical exchanges. These sessions focused on the development of concrete recommendations to inform ongoing initiatives and reform processes across four themes: climate and trade; the COP30 Presidency Roadmaps; climate governance reform; and the Action Agenda. The moderators of each breakout group presented the consolidated findings during the closing plenary session.

In addition, the Dialogue offered participants opportunities to connect beyond the formal and technical sessions through a cultural performance at the Bahia Art Museum and a guided walking tour of Salvador centered on the city's colonial history, Afro-Brazilian heritage and enduring social inequalities. As Brazil's first capital and a key site in the history of the transatlantic slave trade, Salvador provided an important lens through which to reflect on the historical roots of contemporary challenges and the importance of justice,

5. See Annex 2 - Global Policy Dialogue 2026 Programme

6. A separate report dedicated exclusively to the discussions and recommendations emerging from this closed-door dialogue on the COP30 Presidency roadmaps will be published.

inclusion and cultural memory in shaping sustainable futures. These activities celebrated Bahia's rich cultural heritage while reinforcing the role of culture in fostering dialogue, strengthening social connections and inspiring collective action.

To encourage open and constructive dialogue, the event was conducted under the Chatham House Rule. In keeping with this principle, the report does

not attribute comments, observations or recommendations to individual participants or institutions.

This report synthesizes the key findings and recommendations that emerged throughout the Dialogue and aims to inform ongoing discussions on climate governance reform ahead of future climate conferences and related multilateral processes.



2. THE COP30 LEGACY AND THE PATH TOWARD IMPLEMENTATION

While it was acknowledged that progress has been made since the adoption of the Paris Agreement, recent climate science indicates that existing NDCs, even if fully implemented, remain insufficient to place the world on a pathway consistent with the 1.5°C objective.⁷ This reinforces the urgency of accelerating implementation, particularly as the impacts of climate change are materializing faster than previously anticipated.

2023 was the first calendar year in recorded history in which global temperatures exceeded 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, approximately ten years earlier than projected by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Against this backdrop, COP30 took place amid growing pressure to reconsider the viability of

the 1.5°C objective. In response, the Brazilian Presidency emphasized the need to accelerate implementation and create conditions capable of generating positive tipping points and systemic change at scale.⁸ The *Mutirão* Decision, together with the Belém Mission to 1.5 and the Global Implementation Accelerator (GIA) established under it, were presented as mechanisms designed to translate this objective into practice by connecting governments, international organizations, financial institutions, subnational actors, businesses and civil society around common implementation priorities.

The development of the *Mutirão* Decision was described as being structured around three interrelated objectives. The first was to reinforce the support for multilateralism, international

7. United Nations Climate Action, *1.5°C: what it means and why it matters*. Available at: <https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/science/climate-issues/degrees-matter>

8. Positive tipping points are self-reinforcing processes through which relatively small interventions or shifts can trigger exponential and potentially irreversible societal or systemic change, accelerating the transition toward low-carbon and climate-resilient development pathways. For more on this concept, see: Lenton, Timothy M. 2020. *Tipping positive change*. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences. Available at: <https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7017777/>

cooperation and solidarity at a moment of heightened geopolitical uncertainty. The second was the recognition that the climate regime had entered a new phase. With the Paris Agreement rulebook fully operationalized and the political cycle of NDCs already underway, the focus could shift from negotiating new rules toward accelerating the implementation of existing commitments. The third was the need to bring climate responses closer to the needs of people and communities on the ground.

In this regard, the Decision was viewed as significant not only because of its substantive provisions, but because, for the first time, a formal COP decision

explicitly recognized the transition from a climate regime primarily focused on negotiation to one increasingly oriented toward implementation. In doing so, it embodied the COP30 Presidency's ambition to establish Belém as the "COP of Implementation." Adopted within the framework of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement, the Decision was described as unprecedented in that it gave formal expression to this shift through a negotiated outcome carrying normative weight under international law. The GIA and the Belém Mission to 1.5, established under the Decision, were considered important instruments to operationalize this shift.

2.1 ACCELERATING IMPLEMENTATION: THE GLOBAL IMPLEMENTATION ACCELERATOR AND THE BELÉM MISSION TO 1.5

The climate regime currently consists of solutions, resources and actors that remain largely disconnected from one another. The Global Implementation Accelerator (GIA) is conceived as a mechanism to address this by mobilizing a broad coalition of actors around practical solutions to accelerate implementation. It intends to do this by connecting existing technologies, financial instruments, approaches and practices and mobilizing governments at every level, alongside technology actors, academia and civil society, around shared implementation targets. It is expected to focus on a limited number of initiatives with the highest potential to trigger positive tipping points and drive transformative change at a global scale, selected through a scientific process from among those included in the Action

Agenda and its Plans to Accelerate Solutions.

Discussions also highlighted important constraints. Even if the GIA correctly identifies the most transformative solutions, the structural barriers that prevent implementation may remain. Countries that preserve forests or pursue low-carbon development pathways often continue to face economic incentives that favor more carbon-intensive activities. In Brazil, for example, many highly climate-vulnerable municipalities remain unable to access financing because of existing debt constraints. Therefore, the effectiveness of implementation initiatives will ultimately depend on overcoming the barriers that frequently prevent resources from reaching the communities and territories where they are most needed.



RECOMMENDATION:

Develop implementation pathways that explicitly address fiscal, institutional and administrative barriers preventing climate finance from reaching vulnerable communities and territories, including subnational governments facing debt and capacity constraints.

More broadly, governance institutions continue to be designed around assumptions of gradual and linear change, despite growing evidence that complex systems often evolve through abrupt tipping points. Drawing on concepts from complexity science, it was suggested that the same dynamics that enable rapid technological adoption and exponential growth in digital platforms may also apply to climate governance. The GIA was identified as one such

initiative capable of generating these self-reinforcing and scalable processes rather than relying exclusively on incremental change. In this sense, the GIA was described as a prototype intended to test whether a more integrated and innovative approach to implementation can be operationalized and, if successful, potentially inform future reforms within the wider UN system, including through the proposed Climate Council.



RECOMMENDATION:

Prioritize climate action initiatives capable of generating positive tipping points across sectors, technologies and institutions to accelerate systemic change.

While the GIA focuses on technical implementation pathways, the Mission to 1.5 focuses on higher-level political ambition and coordinated global effort aimed directly at keeping the Paris Agreement's 1.5°C temperature target within reach. The Belém Mission to 1.5 is a multi-year Troika platform guided by the COP29, COP30, and COP31 Presidencies and functions as a complementary sister mechanism to the GIA, helping translate climate commitments and

implementation objectives into practical, scalable and bankable investment projects.

It was underscored that the long-term effectiveness of the GIA and the Belém Mission to 1.5 will depend on sustained political support. Their success will therefore be determined by the efforts of future COP presidencies to maintain, strengthen and further institutionalize these mechanisms.



RECOMMENDATION:

Ensure the efficacy and continuity of the GIA and the Belém Mission to 1.5 across future COP presidencies to support their progressive institutionalization and long-term effectiveness.

2.2 CLIMATE GOVERNANCE REFORM

The Concept of Two-Tier Multilateralism

The concept of two-tier multilateralism was widely welcomed as a means of recognizing the need to accelerate practical climate action, while acknowledging that implementation-oriented coalitions and initiatives must operate alongside, rather than in place of, formal negotiations. Formal negotiations should continue to establish and legitimize collective commitments, while implementation mechanisms should focus on delivering what has already been agreed. Once a principle, commitment or objective has been legitimized through consensus, the primary objective should become implementation rather than continual renegotiation. Reopening established commitments risks diverting political attention and resources away from delivery and, in some cases,

creating opportunities for retrogression.

The Santa Marta Conference on fossil fuel transition was cited as an example of a productive complementary space capable of sustaining political engagement when formal negotiations are stalled. While the growing proliferation of voluntary initiatives and informal processes reflects a strong willingness among actors to advance climate action, it was cautioned that such initiatives could inadvertently create incentives for contentious issues to migrate away from the UNFCCC altogether. This concern underscored the importance of expanding implementation-oriented cooperation while ensuring that such efforts do not weaken the centrality of the multilateral negotiating process.



RECOMMENDATION:

Promote complementary implementation-oriented cooperation while preserving the centrality of the UNFCCC negotiating process.

While it was acknowledged that consensus-based processes can slow decision-making and tend to favor the lowest common denominator, treating consensus as inherently incompatible with ambition, participants argued, would be a false claim. The Pact for the Future, adopted by consensus at the United Nations General Assembly, was cited as evidence that meaningful agreements remain possible within consensus-based systems. In addition, consensus should not be confused with unanimity.

Broad political convergence can often be achieved even when not every party agrees with every element of an outcome. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) was cited as a multilateral body that operates without a strict consensus requirement and has adopted significant measures related to decarbonizing international shipping through its Net-Zero Framework. Such experiences demonstrate the potential advantages of more flexible decision-making arrangements in specific contexts.

Reforming the UNFCCC Process

The Dialogue reflected on the internal functioning of the UNFCCC process and the extent to which its institutional architecture remains fit for purpose in an era increasingly defined by implementation rather than negotiation. While preserving the legitimacy and universality of the Convention remains important, the current process faces growing pressures related to complexity and efficiency.

The current COP structure was described as increasingly difficult to manage, with a

growing number of parallel workstreams, recurring negotiations on previously agreed issues and limited space for strategic reflection. Several proposals sought to strengthen the efficiency and implementation focus of the regime, including strengthening the mandates of the Subsidiary Bodies so their outputs carry clearer guidance for national policy, and improving coordination across workstreams to reduce the duplication that drains institutional capacity.



RECOMMENDATION:

Improve coordination across UNFCCC workstreams, including through strengthened mandates for the Subsidiary Bodies, to reduce duplication and support coherence across the climate regime.

The Dialogue emphasized the importance of transparency in how presidencies establish priorities, engage stakeholders and shape political agendas. The role of organized interests

(particularly in sectors such as fossil fuels and plastics) in shaping climate negotiations and influencing the pace and ambition of multilateral outcomes was addressed. The importance of

participation integrity was highlighted, emphasizing that COP processes must ensure transparency regarding institutional affiliations and guard against the disproportionate influence of

interests opposed to ambitious climate action. Lack of transparency risks undermining not only the effectiveness of climate negotiations but also public confidence in their legitimacy.



RECOMMENDATION:

Strengthen transparency regarding institutional affiliations and stakeholder participation at COPs to improve accountability and trust in climate governance processes.

Resistance to certain climate measures often reflects broader economic and fiscal structures, particularly in countries where fossil fuel production plays an important role in public revenues, exports or industrial policy. As a result, climate negotiations frequently involve not only environmental considerations but also debates over economic development, competitiveness and national interests. The Finance Ministers Circle established by the COP30 Presidency was viewed as a potentially important institutional innovation in this regard. By bringing

finance ministries more directly into climate discussions, the initiative sought to connect climate objectives with the institutions responsible for economic policy, public finance and investment decisions around concrete pathways to scale up climate finance. This approach may help strengthen the integration of climate considerations into broader economic decision-making and reduce the disconnect that often exists between climate commitments and the fiscal policies required to implement them.



RECOMMENDATION:

Improve and expand the engagement of finance ministries in climate governance processes to better align climate commitments with economic and fiscal policy.

A recurring concern throughout the Dialogue was how to ensure continuity in

a system built around annually rotating COP presidencies. One way the COP30

Presidency sought to ensure institutional continuity, as well as foster inclusive dialogues and accelerate climate action, was to introduce a set of institutional innovations by establishing four mobilization circles. In addition to the previously mentioned Finance Circle, it also instituted the COP Presidents' Circle, which brought together former COP presidents since COP21 to analyze and strengthen the future governance and effectiveness of the UNFCCC process; the People's Circle, with the intent to expand the participation of Indigenous peoples, traditional communities and Afro-descendant peoples in climate decision-making; the Global Ethical Stocktake, which introduced ethical and moral dimensions into the climate response.⁹

In addition, the presidency established five technical advisory councils on adaptation, science, economy, technological innovation and artificial intelligence. It also appointed a network of regional and sectoral Special Envoys. These were recognized leaders in their respective fields, and served as points of contact for the Presidency, helping to expand the reach and effectiveness of COP's preparatory efforts.¹⁰ While not constituting formal reforms of the UNFCCC, several innovations introduced by the COP30 Presidency were viewed as potential models for strengthening continuity and participation and may even require institutionalization if they

are to become a lasting feature of the climate regime.

Many of the innovations associated with COP30 depended heavily on sustained political engagement over several years. Brazil's successive leadership roles in major international forums, including the G20, BRICS and ACTO, were widely viewed as exceptional in this regard. Few future presidencies are likely to enjoy a comparable sequence of opportunities to shape the international climate agenda.

The dual arrangement for COP31 was discussed as one attempt to address this challenge. Under the proposed model, Türkiye will hold the COP presidency and oversee the Action Agenda, while Australia will lead the negotiation track. Given the increasing complexity of the climate agenda, this division of responsibilities was viewed as a potentially useful mechanism for ensuring sustained political attention to both implementation and negotiations and interaction between them. Nevertheless, it was acknowledged that the approach remains untested.

Looking further ahead, discussions on the Ethiopian COP32 Presidency highlighted the importance of long-term planning and institutional memory. Ethiopia's efforts to position Africa not only as a region highly exposed to climate impacts, but also as a source of solutions and leadership was noted. Preparations for COP32 were

9. Ministry of Environment and Climate Change (Brazil), *The Global Ethical Stocktake Report 2025*, available here: https://www.gov.br/mma/pt-br/centrais-de-conteudo/publicacoes/cop30/global_report_ges.pdf

10. Seven regional Special Envoys chosen to represent major geographic zones, and twenty-two sectoral Special Envoys to conduct outreach across priority regions and constituencies across areas such as business, unions, women, and subnational governments. For full list of COP30 Special Envoys, see: <https://cop30.br/en/brazilian-presidency/special-envoys>

described as already underway, including the establishment of a national steering committee and dedicated working groups. The emphasis on building upon the experiences of previous African presidencies, particularly Morocco, Egypt and South Africa, was viewed as an encouraging signal of sustained African engagement in shaping the future direction of the climate agenda.

More broadly, climate governance cannot depend solely on the quality of individual

presidencies. Despite the five-year framework established for the Action Agenda, anchoring implementation efforts within longer-term structures, institutional arrangements can only partially compensate for the role of political leadership. Ultimately, the challenge is to build a climate governance system capable of maintaining momentum even when future presidencies vary in capacity, ambition and political priorities.

The Proposed United Nations Climate Change Council

Originally proposed by President Lula at the 2024 G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro, the idea of a United Nations Climate Change Council was discussed as a response to the growing gap between the scale and urgency of climate risks and the ability of existing institutions to respond in a timely and coordinated manner. Concerns regarding climate tipping points and other systemic risks have intensified in recent years, while the multilateral system continues to rely primarily on consensus-based decision-making. Against this backdrop, the proposed Council was presented as a mechanism capable of elevating climate issues to the United Nations General Assembly, where decisions are adopted through majority voting rather than consensus, potentially helping to overcome some of the limitations associated with consensus-based processes when urgent collective action is required.

The proposed Council is not intended as a replacement for the UNFCCC, but rather as a complementary mechanism through which climate issues could be addressed within the wider United Nations system. At the same time, any body operating alongside the Convention would

need to avoid creating institutional fragmentation or weakening incentives for negotiation within the UNFCCC, potentially creating a governance trap in which parties unwilling to compromise can avoid difficult negotiations without bearing the political costs of obstruction. The Climate Council could be perceived as a way of circumventing the consensus-based procedures of the UNFCCC, noting that if issues that cannot secure agreement within the Convention are simply transferred to a body operating through majority voting, this could create tensions with the authority and legitimacy of the treaty process itself. While the United Nations General Assembly possesses broad political legitimacy, it does not necessarily generate the same level of political mobilization, ministerial participation and public attention as the COP processes, reinforcing the importance of ensuring that any complementary mechanism serves to strengthen and support the UNFCCC rather than operate as an alternative to it.

Other approaches were also discussed. Rather than creating a new institution, some participants suggested building more formal multi-tier governance

arrangements within the existing climate architecture, allowing coalitions of willing countries to advance specific initiatives without requiring universal consensus while preserving the legitimacy and universality of the UNFCCC process. The Kyoto Protocol was cited as a possible precedent for such an approach, demonstrating how differentiated commitments can coexist within a broader multilateral framework while preserving the legitimacy of the climate regime.

Experience from recent UN reform processes was cited as a cautionary reminder of the fragility of institutional innovation. The Secretary-General's proposed Emergency Platform was removed from the Pact for the Future shortly before its adoption, despite

having progressed through much of the negotiating process. The episode was viewed as evidence that governance reforms can remain politically vulnerable until the final stages of negotiation, underscoring the need for sustained political support if proposals such as a Climate Council are to succeed.

While the feasibility of a Climate Council remains uncertain, discussions highlighted a broader concern: existing governance arrangements are struggling to keep pace with the growing complexity and urgency of climate challenges. As a result, the search for more effective forms of climate governance is likely to remain a central feature of international climate diplomacy in the years ahead.

The Judicialization of Climate Governance

The recent advisory opinions issued by the International Court of Justice (ICJ)¹¹ and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR)¹² signal a growing role of international and regional courts in shaping climate obligations, extending climate governance beyond the boundaries of the UNFCCC and

the Paris Agreement. The subsequent endorsement of the ICJ opinion by the United Nations General Assembly strengthened its political significance and reinforced the idea that states' climate responsibilities derive from a wider body of international environmental and human rights law.

11. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an Advisory Opinion on *Advisory Opinion on Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change*, declaring climate change an urgent existential threat, ruling that countries have binding, enforceable legal obligations under international law to protect the climate system and must take action to prevent significant environmental harm. See: International Court of Justice, *Advisory Opinion on Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change*, July 23, 2025. Available at: <https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/187/187-20250723-adv-01-00-en.pdf>

12. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) issued an Advisory Opinion (OC-32/25) on the Climate Emergency and Human Rights, declaring that a stable climate is an autonomous, standalone human right. It legally mandates States to actively prevent irreversible climate damage and establishes that extreme environmental degradation is a human rights violation. See: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, *Advisory Opinion Ao-32/25*, May 29, 2025. Available at: https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_32_en.pdf

Unlike the ICJ, whose jurisdiction is limited to states and international organizations, the Inter-American human rights framework provides avenues through which individuals, communities and NGOs can pursue climate-related rights claims. The doctrine of conventionality was highlighted, under which domestic courts are expected to interpret and apply national law in a manner consistent with the Court's jurisprudence. As a result, climate-related obligations articulated at the regional level have begun influencing domestic judicial decisions across Latin America.

The explicit reference to tipping points in the IACtHR advisory opinion was seen as a particularly important development. The opinion addresses the obligation of states to prevent irreversible environmental harm and links climate impacts to the protection of fundamental rights. Article 291 of the opinion further states that these obligations are of "peremptory importance and are, therefore, of a *jus cogens* nature."¹³ This places them among the highest norms of international law, from which no derogation is permitted, meaning that any treaty conflicting with this norm is considered legally void and that states have obligations not to recognize or assist breaches of such

norms. This was viewed as a significant evolution in the legal treatment of climate risks and tipping points.

This legal shift presents practical implications for small island developing states and other highly vulnerable countries, for whom the gap between climate commitments and lived reality is not merely theoretical. In this sense, the advisory opinions were framed as helping narrow the long-standing gap between commitments announced and commitments delivered by reinforcing that climate obligations exist within a legal framework, rather than solely a political one. These implications extend beyond states to financial institutions, regulators, civil society organizations and international organizations that are increasingly engaged in climate accountability efforts.

At the same time, it was noted that while advisory opinions are significant in shaping legal interpretation and political expectations, their effectiveness will ultimately depend on whether governments, courts and public institutions at the national and subnational levels translate those principles into concrete policies, regulations and decisions.



RECOMMENDATION:

Make use of emerging international legal guidance, including the ICJ advisory opinion, to strengthen domestic climate legislation, emissions targets, adaptation planning, reporting systems and institutional accountability.

13. Idem.

Emerging Challenge: Carbon Dioxide Removal

Discussions identified carbon dioxide removal (CDR) as an emerging challenge likely to gain prominence in future implementation debates, given the growing possibility of a temporary overshoot of the 1.5°C goal and the recognition that emissions reductions alone may be insufficient to return temperatures to safer levels.

Unlike emissions reductions, however, carbon removal raises a distinct set of governance questions. Approaches range from ecosystem restoration and reforestation to engineered technologies such as direct air capture, each with different costs, risks, land-use implications and equity considerations.

No comprehensive international framework currently exists to govern how these technologies should be deployed, monitored or financed.

This governance gap is likely to become increasingly important over the coming decade. As investment, research and commercial deployment accelerate, there is a risk that technological and market developments will outpace the multilateral system's ability to establish common rules, safeguards and principles. Discussions suggested that the governance of carbon removal may therefore emerge as one of the next major frontiers of international climate cooperation.

2.3 THE COP30 ROADMAPS: OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES AND PATHWAYS FOR IMPLEMENTATION

Despite carrying no formal legal status within the UNFCCC process, the two Roadmaps constitute an important political achievement of COP30. Their development reflects a growing willingness among countries to explore alternative pathways for advancing climate action. While the voluntary nature of the Roadmaps, on the one hand, offers flexibility and enables progress among willing actors, it also raises questions

regarding accountability, continuity and political legitimacy. Initiatives developed outside the negotiating process may struggle to sustain support over time if they lack clear institutional anchors and mechanisms for accountability. To address this, it is essential that the Roadmaps incorporate measurable milestones and practical mechanisms for tracking progress without creating excessive administrative burdens.



RECOMMENDATION:

Incorporate reporting and accountability frameworks with measurable milestones into the design of the Roadmaps to support monitoring and evaluation of implementation progress.

A related concern was that the voluntary nature of the Roadmaps could unintentionally weaken rather than strengthen the formal negotiating process. If parallel implementation frameworks become sufficiently prominent, parties opposed to ambitious climate action could argue that issues such as the transition away from fossil fuels (TAFF) are already being addressed elsewhere and therefore no longer require attention within negotiated UNFCCC outcomes. Therefore, the Roadmaps must serve as complementary frameworks to formal negotiations.

While the Roadmaps were widely viewed as valuable implementation instruments, discussions highlighted the need to strengthen coherence with the Global Stocktake, Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), the GIA, the Action Agenda and other emerging climate governance initiatives. Maintaining these connections was viewed as essential to ensuring that the Roadmaps contribute to a more coherent and effective

implementation architecture rather than becoming isolated processes operating in parallel.

Ultimately, the value of the Roadmaps will not be measured by the number of endorsements they receive, but by their capacity to influence national policies, investment decisions and implementation strategies. The challenge moving forward is therefore not only maintaining political support for the Roadmaps, but ensuring that they become effective instruments for accelerating implementation across diverse national contexts. Thus, their success will depend on national ownership. This means translating them into national and sectoral implementation pathways adapted to local circumstances. It was emphasized that these responsibilities extend well beyond environment ministries and require engagement from other ministries, planning authorities, sectoral agencies, subnational governments, businesses and civil society organizations.



RECOMMENDATION:

Integrate the Roadmaps into national development, investment and sectoral planning processes, adapting them to local circumstances and engaging finance, planning, energy, industry and other relevant authorities, alongside subnational governments, business and civil society.

In countries where governments remain reluctant to adopt ambitious climate policies, civil society organizations, research institutions and think tanks were identified as important actors

capable of maintaining public debate, generating evidence and building political pressure for the development of national implementation pathways.



RECOMMENDATION:

Strengthen the capacity of civil society organizations, research institutions and think tanks to generate evidence, sustain public debate and support the development of national implementation pathways.

Although both Roadmaps face common questions regarding continuity, accountability and implementation,

discussions revealed important distinctions in their political dynamics and institutional challenges.

The Fossil Fuels Roadmap

Discussions on the Fossil Fuels Roadmap were shaped by a shared recognition that the question of transitioning away from fossil fuels must move from the margins to the center of climate governance. The reference to transitioning away from fossil fuels in the COP28 outcome marked the first time in nearly three decades of climate negotiations that fossil fuels had been explicitly acknowledged in a negotiated UNFCCC decision. Against this backdrop, the COP30 Fossil Fuels Roadmap emerged as an effort to translate an important political breakthrough into a structured implementation process.

There is no universal forum specifically responsible for managing the TAFF. The UNFCCC addresses climate change broadly, with no explicit mandate to coordinate fossil fuel phase-out. The International Energy Agency (IEA) produces influential analysis, but its membership is limited to 32 countries. In this context, the Santa Marta Conference, convened in Colombia in April 2026, was cited as an important milestone in the

evolution of the TAFF. The establishment of a scientific advisory component and the commitment to continue the process beyond its inaugural meeting demonstrated that technically substantive discussions on fossil fuel transition can take place outside formal UNFCCC negotiations.

The Dialogue revealed that the long-term effectiveness of the Fossil Fuels Roadmap will depend on its ability to establish institutional footholds across multiple processes rather than relying on a single implementation pathway. Three avenues through which the Roadmap could evolve were identified.

The first relates to the second Global Stocktake(GST2).TheGST2wasdescribed as the most significant opportunity to anchor the Roadmap within the formal architecture of the UNFCCC. Rather than attempting to secure its incorporation into COP31 negotiations, which many viewed as premature and potentially counterproductive, emphasizing the importance of building political support

and technical foundations in the lead-up to GST2. Given that the Paris Agreement requires each new round of NDCs to be informed by the latest GST, anchoring the Roadmaps within the GST could create an institutional pathway through which transition commitments gradually become reflected in national climate planning. This would enable countries to incorporate fossil fuel transition objectives into their NDCs, rather than treating the Roadmaps as a separate voluntary process. Embedding the

Roadmaps within GST2 also provides the strategic anchor that helps reduce the risk of displacing continued negotiations on the TAFF away from the formal UNFCCC process.

A second pathway involves its incorporation into the Global Climate Action Agenda. This presents an opportunity to move the Roadmap beyond political declarations and connect it to coalitions, initiatives and implementation plans capable of generating tangible and scalable outcomes.



RECOMMENDATION:

Build the political support and technical foundations necessary to anchor the Roadmap in the second Global Stocktake to strengthen its integration into the broader climate governance architecture, while also fostering its connection with the Global Climate Action Agenda.

The third pathway centers on the development of national roadmaps. The effectiveness of the international process will depend on the willingness of countries to undertake their own transition planning. Brazil's efforts to develop a national roadmap, involving multiple ministries, were cited as an important signal of political commitment and national ownership. Its success will ultimately depend on countries

undertaking similar efforts domestically. The political divisions that complicate negotiations at the international level are often replicated within national governments, particularly in countries where fossil fuels play an important economic role, requiring coordination across ministries and overcoming competing domestic political and economic interests.



RECOMMENDATION:

Promote the development of national fossil fuel transition roadmaps through coordinated, whole-of-government processes involving relevant ministries, agencies and public institutions, while also supporting the development of a global roadmap and other relevant international cooperation processes.

At the same time, the success of the Roadmap will depend on expanding participation beyond countries and stakeholders already supportive of transition efforts. Traditional North-South framings were seen as providing only a partial explanation of current political dynamics. Resistance to transition commitments increasingly emerges from countries whose economies remain heavily dependent on fossil fuel production, regardless of their level of development. In this context, the

transition away from fossil fuels cannot be reduced to an emissions debate alone. Implementation pathways must reconcile climate objectives with development priorities, poverty reduction and energy security concerns. The success of the Roadmap will therefore depend on its ability to engage directly with the economic and political interests underpinning fossil fuel production and to demonstrate credible pathways toward economic diversification, job creation and sustainable development.



RECOMMENDATION:

Address the economic and political drivers of fossil fuel dependence by engaging countries whose economies remain heavily reliant on fossil fuels in the development of transition solutions adapted to their national circumstances.

The relationship between the Roadmap and proposals for a Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty was also discussed, with both initiatives potentially capable of reinforcing one another. While the Roadmap seeks to advance voluntary

cooperation and implementation, some argued that more binding arrangements may eventually be required if the scale and pace of the transition are to match climate objectives. At the same time, discussions cautioned against the proliferation of

disconnected processes pursuing similar goals, emphasizing that the effectiveness of the Roadmap will depend on its ability to serve as a platform for coordination, connecting related initiatives and creating a shared narrative rather than adding another layer of institutional fragmentation. In this sense, processes such as the Santa Marta Conference were viewed as important in creating the

political conditions for stronger forms of international cooperation in the future.

Although discussed separately, participants emphasized that the Fossil Fuels and Deforestation Roadmaps are closely interconnected. At the same time, they involve different political dynamics, institutional arrangements and timelines, requiring distinct approaches.

The Deforestation Roadmap

While the Deforestation Roadmap enjoys broad political support, there remains less clarity regarding the institutional architecture, political coalition and implementation mechanisms than its fossil fuels counterpart. This lack of clearly identifiable international processes risks losing political momentum and coordinated effort. Therefore, there is an urgent need for stronger institutional anchoring, clearer implementation pathways and more explicit connections to existing forest, biodiversity and climate initiatives.

This challenge is further intensified by the fact that the 2030 deadline was described as effectively “tomorrow in policy terms.” While this urgency increases the importance of the Deforestation Roadmap, it also makes implementation politically more difficult, given the scale of action required within a very short timeframe. This urgency was illustrated through the recent warning of an elevated risk of an unprecedented Super El Niño event in the coming years, with an early warning already issued for the Amazonian border region. Potential impacts include extreme drought, heat waves, wildfires and flooding. It was argued that risks of this magnitude should be treated with the

same seriousness as other public safety threats, emphasizing that delayed action could result in severe and potentially irreversible consequences.

Unlike the Fossil Fuels Roadmap, which benefits from the Santa Marta Conference, the Deforestation Roadmap currently lacks a comparable multilateral platform capable of sustaining political momentum and coordination between COP cycles. Despite deforestation already being addressed through a range of international institutions and agreements, including the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) and the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF), previous international commitments to halt deforestation failed to meet their targets. The principal challenge, therefore, lies not in the absence of institutions but in the fragmentation of efforts across multiple governance frameworks. The Deforestation Roadmap should seek to function primarily as a coordination mechanism capable of aligning existing initiatives around a shared objective rather than creating an additional process.

Additionally, the need to reframe deforestation not solely as an environmental issue, but as a challenge directly linked to food security, economic development and long-term resilience was underscored. Participants highlighted the critical role of tropical forests in regulating rainfall patterns and water cycles that sustain agricultural production across entire regions. In this view, deforestation poses risks not only to biodiversity and climate stability but also to food systems, agricultural productivity and economic resilience. The Roadmap was therefore seen as an opportunity to broaden the political constituency supporting forest protection by connecting it to concerns shared across both developed and developing countries.

Beyond the role of forests in sustaining rainfall patterns essential for agricultural production, discussions also highlighted important synergies between the Deforestation and Fossil Fuels Roadmaps. The production of biofuels and fertilizers were both cited as examples of the interdependence between energy, agriculture and land-

use systems. Fertilizer production remains heavily dependent on fossil fuels, linking fossil fuel transition strategies to agricultural productivity, food security and rural livelihoods. At the same time, agricultural expansion remains a major driver of deforestation in many regions, meaning that policies affecting energy, fertilizer production and agricultural systems can have significant implications for both emission reduction and forest conservation outcomes.

The energy transition itself may generate new pressures on forests through competition for land, increased demand for bioenergy feedstocks and the extraction of critical minerals required for low-carbon technologies. These interactions were viewed as a reminder that climate solutions developed in isolation may create unintended consequences elsewhere. As a result, the importance of ensuring coherence between the two Roadmaps and adopting integrated approaches capable of addressing climate, energy, land use and development objectives simultaneously was emphasized.



RECOMMENDATIONS:

- ▲ Position the Deforestation Roadmap as a coordination mechanism to align existing forest, biodiversity, climate, food security and development initiatives around the shared objective of halting and reversing deforestation by 2030.
- ▲ Strengthen coordination and synergies between the Deforestation and Fossil Fuels Roadmaps to address interconnected challenges related to land use, energy and food security.

Another issue that featured prominently throughout the discussions was the growing role of organized crime in driving deforestation. Illegal deforestation, land grabbing, illicit mining and money laundering are increasingly interconnected and often operate through transnational criminal networks. In this context, efforts to halt deforestation cannot rely solely on environmental policies and conservation

measures. Instead, they require stronger cooperation across law enforcement agencies, judicial systems, anti-corruption institutions and environmental authorities. The intersection between climate action, environmental crime and organized criminal networks remains insufficiently addressed within existing multilateral processes and deserves greater attention moving forward.



RECOMMENDATION:

Ensure that the Deforestation Roadmap recognizes the role of organized environmental crime as a driver of deforestation and supports stronger coordination between environmental, law enforcement, judicial and anti-corruption authorities through relevant existing national, regional and multilateral processes.

Indigenous territories were repeatedly identified as some of the most effective barriers against deforestation and Indigenous peoples, traditional communities and local actors should not be treated merely as beneficiaries of forest policies, but as rights-holders and central partners in their design and

implementation. Several interventions stressed that the effectiveness and legitimacy of the Roadmaps will depend on their ability to incorporate Indigenous knowledge, strengthen territorial governance and expand direct support to communities responsible for protecting forests on the ground.



RECOMMENDATION:

Embed Indigenous peoples, traditional communities and local actors as rights-holders and central partners throughout the design, governance and implementation of the Roadmap.

2.4 THE REFORM OF THE GLOBAL CLIMATE ACTION AGENDA

One of the most significant changes the COP30 Presidency introduced was the reform of the Global Climate Action Agenda.¹⁴ It sought to strengthen the role of the Action Agenda by setting out a structured 5-year framework that integrates the GIA and the Belém Mission to 1.5 alongside the hundreds of active non-party stakeholder initiatives. The Agenda had long been criticized for functioning primarily as a platform for announcing voluntary commitments with limited accountability or follow-up. The Brazilian Presidency sought to address this challenge by repositioning the Agenda as a mechanism focused on effective, real-life implementation.

The redesigned Agenda is structured around six thematic pillars and 30 objectives anchored in the outcomes of the first GST, covering energy, industry and transport; forests, nature and biodiversity; agriculture and food systems; cities, resilience and water; human and social development; and the means of implementation. While the GST language can be dense and technical, the six axes are intended to be readable and actionable by companies, subnational governments, civil society organizations and financial institutions alike.

A mapping exercise identified hundreds of existing coalitions and initiatives already working across these themes, but mostly disconnected from one other and the COP process. Rather than

creating new structures, the objective was to improve coordination among existing efforts with the priorities identified through the GST. These were consolidated into 482 initiatives aligned with the 30 objectives. Each objective is supported by dedicated activation groups that consolidate related initiatives, monitor and demonstrate impacts, through concrete acceleration plans designed to scale solutions in the lead-up to GST2 in 2028.

The development of Plans to Accelerate Solutions (PAS) emerged as one of the Agenda's most significant innovations. Unlike individual initiatives, these plans bring together multiple coalitions working on shared challenges to identify practical interventions capable of accelerating implementation at scale. The energy sector was cited as an example, with coalitions working on renewable energy, electricity grids and storage collaborating around shared implementation pathways and investment strategies. This was viewed as an important bridge between the coalition ecosystem of the Action Agenda and the broader implementation architecture emerging from COP30. The energy sector provided a concrete illustration of how a PAS can aggregate existing initiatives into a single framework. A utilities coalition established at COP28 joined forces at COP30 with the Green Grids Initiative, launched at COP26, as well as International Renewable Energy

14. COP30. *Action Agenda*. Aug 28, 2025. Available at: <https://cop30.br/en/action-agenda>

Agency (IRENA), the Clean Energy Ministerial and 22 other initiatives to produce a single acceleration plan for the sector. The utilities coalition reported meeting its original COP28 commitment of mobilizing US\$117 billion in annual investment and raising that target to US\$148 billion. Together, the 26 participating initiatives set a collective target of mobilizing US\$1 trillion by 2035, while aiming to expand installed grid storage capacity to 1,500 gigawatts by 2030 and 3,000 gigawatts by 2035.¹⁵

Discussions also focused on whether the Action Agenda would be capable of sustaining political engagement across future COP cycles. The Turkish COP31 Presidency has committed to maintaining the six thematic axes and the existing framework of objectives while adapting its own priorities within that architecture, with resilient cities and infrastructure cited as one area where the incoming presidency may place particular emphasis. The Agenda's coalition ecosystem itself may help support this process, as coalitions and networks often persist beyond individual presidencies and retain institutional knowledge that does not depend on formal handovers.

The integration of the Action Agenda with the High-Level Climate Champions was similarly viewed as a bridge capable of

supporting continuity across COP cycles. While future presidencies may vary in ambition and political engagement, the institutional foundations of the reformed Action Agenda create a more coherent framework capable of maintaining momentum across presidencies.

The Action Agenda, the COP30 Roadmaps and the GIA should be understood as complementary instruments. In simplified terms, the Roadmaps identify what needs to happen, the Action Agenda identifies who is already working on it, and the GIA seeks to identify which interventions have the greatest potential to generate transformational impact. Aligning GST indicators, GGA targets, Roadmap milestones, NDC commitments and Action Agenda reporting systems was identified as a major challenge for the next cycle. Maintaining this coherence will be essential if the broader framework developed under COP30 is to function as an integrated system rather than a collection of parallel initiatives. Efforts to organize Climate Weeks around the same thematic structure were highlighted as a promising mechanism for sustained engagement on the Action Agenda between COP cycles, strengthening coherence across climate action initiatives.

15. COP30 Brasil, *Power Sector Companies Raise Investment Target in Clean Energy Grids to USD 148 Billion per Year*. November 15, 2025. Available at: <https://cop30.br/en/news-about-cop30/power-sector-companies-raise-investment-target-in-clean-energy-grids-to-usd-148-billion-per-year>



RECOMMENDATION:

Strengthen coherence across the post-COP30 implementation architecture by aligning GST indicators, GGA targets, Roadmap milestones, NDC commitments and Action Agenda reporting systems, while using Climate Weeks to sustain coordination, accountability and continuity between COP cycles.

Accountability and Transparency

A central objective of the reform was to address longstanding concerns about greenwashing within the Action Agenda. Actors would announce initiatives, gain the associated publicity, and then fail to follow through, with little accountability attached to the announcement itself. In response, participation is now governed by two eligibility criteria explicitly designed to address this concern: initiatives must be organized as coalitions rather than individual organizations, and they must pursue a clear, measurable and time-bound objective linked to the implementation of the Paris Agreement, allowing progress to be tracked over time. The Indigenous Forest Tenure Pledge was cited as a concrete illustration of this shift in practice. Originally announced at COP26 as a five-year, US\$1.7 billion philanthropic funding commitment, the pledge was presented as an example of how measurable targets and clear timelines can help address concerns about greenwashing.¹⁶ It was reported as having been delivered ahead of schedule, offering a tangible illustration of the type

of follow-through the new criteria are intended to encourage.

To complement these accountability efforts, an additional safeguard focused on transparency and information integrity was also described. Under the Action Agenda's information integrity objective, a community of university researchers was cited as working to reduce greenwashing within the Agenda by producing independent data intended to improve the transparency of what coalitions report. However, questions regarding the broader curation process, including how initiatives are vetted given the diversity of actors involved, and how participants might raise concerns regarding controversial or contested initiatives once admitted, remain practical challenges of the redesigned system.

Beyond safeguards aimed at individual initiatives and coalitions, discussions also addressed the broader accountability architecture surrounding the Action Agenda. It was noted that the Biennial

16. Forest Tenure Funders Group. *COP26 Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities Forest Tenure Pledge. 2021–2025*. Available at: <https://www.tenurepledge.org/cop-26-pledge/>

Transparency Reports already perform part of this function, but should not be expected to carry the full burden of ensuring accountability across the climate regime. Additional proposals raised included greater transparency regarding coalitions' institutional affiliations, clearer participation and reporting requirements, improved tracking tools and the development of a potential global implementation dashboard for the Action Agenda, which could function as a monitoring and transparency mechanism.

Despite the substantial increase in reporting rates under the new structure, with reporting improving sixfold compared to previous cycles, fewer than half of the 482 initiatives currently report complete indicators. Initiatives that fail to report may be removed from activation groups, creating a degree of accountability that did not previously exist. Nevertheless, demonstrating tangible implementation outcomes, rather than simply reporting activities and engagement, remains one of the central challenges for the next phase of the Agenda.



RECOMMENDATION:

Strengthen transparency, monitoring and verification mechanisms within the Action Agenda, including clearer participation and reporting requirements and independent tracking tools, such as a potential global implementation dashboard, to improve accountability, reduce the risk of greenwashing and demonstrate concrete outcomes in support of the implementation of the Paris Agreement.

Participation, Inclusion and Multilevel Governance

Participants identified several structural inclusion gaps within the current coalition ecosystem. The first concerns geography. Despite the global scope and participation of the Action Agenda, leadership remains heavily concentrated among Global North actors, with most country-led coalitions coordinated by European governments. Beyond disparities in institutional capacity and resources, this concentration also reflects the limited number of Global South countries that have brought

forward home-grown solutions for international scaling. This was described as “a task for the Global South” as much as a structural shortcoming of the Action Agenda’s design. Regional institutions were identified as one potential avenue for addressing this gap. In this regard, the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO) was highlighted as a potential partner capable of bringing forward regionally developed solutions and perspectives.



RECOMMENDATION:

Increase Global South leadership within Action Agenda coalitions by identifying, supporting and scaling solutions originating in developing countries and regions, while strengthening the role of regional institutions, such as the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization, in advancing locally generated approaches within the Action Agenda's solutions ecosystem.

The second structural inclusion gap concerns gender participation. Rather than establishing a separate thematic track, the Presidency sought to mainstream gender considerations across all six thematic axes of the Action Agenda. This approach was generally welcomed as consistent with broader efforts to integrate inclusion across implementation processes rather than treating it as a standalone issue. In this regard, participants highlighted the adoption of the UNFCCC Gender Action Plan (GAP), a nine-year framework (2026-2034) that establishes concrete objectives for advancing women's leadership, recognizing care work and strengthening gender-responsive climate action. Ensuring that these commitments translate into implementation across sectors was identified as an important challenge moving forward.

A third challenge relates to youth participation. While youth engagement has become increasingly visible within climate governance, youth organizations

remain underrepresented within the coalition ecosystem of the Action Agenda. This reflects, in part, the fact that many youth groups operate primarily in advocacy, mobilization and awareness-raising spaces rather than within the coalition-and-reporting architecture required by the Agenda. To address these barriers, the Presidency recently introduced "communities of action" organized around each thematic axis.¹⁷ Open to a wider range of civil society actors, these communities are intended to serve as an entry point into the broader Action Agenda ecosystem.

The fourth concerns the participation of Indigenous peoples and local communities, recognized as rights-holders, custodians of traditional knowledge and key actors in the territorial implementation of climate commitments, particularly in relation to forests, biodiversity and adaptation. This recognition is increasingly being accompanied by efforts to expand direct support for Indigenous and local

17. COP30. *Action Agenda event connects COP30 and COP31 around climate implementation*. April 1, 2026. Available at: <https://cop30.br/en/action-agenda-event-connects-cop30-and-cop31-around-climate-implementation>

community stewardship of territories, reflecting a growing understanding that securing land rights and strengthening territorial governance are essential components of effective climate action. COP30 marked the renewal and expansion of the previously mentioned Forest Tenure Funders Group COP26 Pledge to US\$1.8 billion for 2026-2030 to support land tenure rights and forest conservation, contributing to a broader intergovernmental commitment by 15 countries to protect 160 million hectares of Indigenous and local community lands. Brazil's contribution covers 63 million hectares,

of which 59 million are for Indigenous peoples and 4 million for Quilombola communities through demarcation, legal regularization, territorial protection and the implementation of the National Territorial and Environmental Management Policy.¹⁸ Despite the pledge representing an important advance, this approach reflects a broader gap. The focus on tropical forests leaves out other vulnerable biomes, such as the Cerrado, the Caatinga and other regions, underscoring the need to develop additional plans extending support beyond tropical forest contexts.



RECOMMENDATION:

Strengthen inclusive participation across the Action Agenda by mainstreaming gender considerations into initiatives, expanding entry points for youth and civil society engagement, and ensuring that coalitions supporting Indigenous peoples and local communities extend beyond tropical forest biomes to other vulnerable ecosystems.

The fifth concerns parliamentary engagement. Climate implementation ultimately depends on legislation, municipal ordinances, budget appropriations and regulatory decisions, all of which require elected officials. Yet, parliamentary coalitions remain largely absent from the Action Agenda

framework. Municipal initiatives related to sustainable mobility and decarbonization of the construction sector, for example, are underway, often without any connection to the broader Action Agenda architecture. Proposals for a dedicated parliamentary forum within the Action Agenda have been submitted to the

18. Forest & Climate Leaders' Partnership. *High-Level Event on the Intergovernmental Land Tenure Commitment at COP30*. November 20, 2025. Available at: <https://forestclimateleaders.org/news-and-resources/high-level-event-on-the-intergovernmental-land-tenure-commitment-at-cop30/>

COP30 Presidency, reflecting growing recognition of the need to strengthen legislative participation and connections between international implementation

initiatives and legislative actors if climate commitments are to translate into durable domestic policies.



RECOMMENDATION:

Establish a dedicated parliamentary forum within the Action Agenda framework to connect municipal, state and national legislators with the broader ecosystem of climate coalitions and implementation initiatives.

The discussion of parliamentary participation also led to a broader reflection on the role of subnational actors in climate implementation. Participants observed a structural tension in the treatment of subnational governments within the UNFCCC system, where they remain classified as non-state actors despite driving a significant share of mitigation and adaptation efforts. At the same time, the principal barrier municipalities face is often not the availability of climate finance itself, but limited technical capacity to design projects, prepare bankable proposals and meet the requirements of funding mechanisms. In this sense, the success of NDCs ultimately depends on the ability of states, provinces and municipalities to translate national commitments into policies, investments and projects.

The Coalition for High Ambition Multilevel Partnerships (CHAMP), launched at

COP28, was presented as an important institutional framework for advancing multilevel climate governance, although it was noted that it initially lacked an operational instrument capable of linking national climate policy to state and municipal action. Brazil was among the first countries to embed the multilevel governance principle directly into its NDC, and the announcement at COP30 of the Multilevel Governance Acceleration Plan was highlighted as a practical attempt to operationalize this approach by establishing commitments, monitoring mechanisms and coordination structures linking national climate objectives to implementation at the local level.¹⁹

The Plan responds directly to a set of persistent challenges, including weak coordination between levels of government, fragmented data systems, limited technical capacity at the municipal level and difficulties accessing climate

19. COP30. *Brazil Leads New Global Effort to Accelerate Multilevel Climate Action*. November 11, 2025. Available at: <https://cop30.br/en/news-about-cop30/brazil-leads-new-global-effort-to-accelerate-multilevel-climate-action>

finance. The initiative AdaptaCidades was presented as a practical national response to these barriers, providing technical support, capacity building and pathways to financing for local governments that would otherwise

struggle to access climate resources.²⁰ Such models may offer lessons applicable beyond Brazil and could potentially be adapted and disseminated through the CHAMP coalition.



RECOMMENDATION:

Use the CHAMP coalition as a platform to support the implementation of the Multilevel Governance Acceleration Plan and to share and adapt lessons from Brazil's AdaptaCidades in other countries, helping strengthen coordination across levels of government, build local technical capacity and improve access to climate finance.

Another area of growing attention within the Action Agenda concerns the protection of environmental defenders. Participants discussed the development of the Acceleration Plan for Environmental Human Rights Defenders, organized around three pillars: security, governance and institutional coordination. The initiative seeks to strengthen protections for individuals and communities operating in high-risk environments while improving access to resources and institutional support. Illegal logging, land grabbing, organized crime and other illicit activities not only directly affect Indigenous territories

and frontline communities, but also increasingly represent governance challenges for forest protection and climate action more broadly. As a result, the success of the Deforestation Roadmap, the protection of Indigenous territories and broader territorial implementation efforts will require greater attention to these dynamics. The Action Agenda's emerging work on environmental defenders was highlighted as one of the few climate initiatives explicitly addressing the intersection between environmental protection, security and governance. The initiative remains at an early stage of

20. AdaptaCidades is an initiative of Brazil's Green and Resilient Cities Program, coordinated by the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change with support from the Ministries of Science, Technology and Innovation and Cities. It aims to strengthen climate adaptation and resilience policies by improving coordination and cooperation across different levels of government, while supporting local authorities in the planning and implementation of adaptation measures.

development. Indicators and monitoring mechanisms are still being defined, with further progress expected through COP31, and its effectiveness will depend

substantially on the willingness of civil society organizations to engage with and help shape the process.



RECOMMENDATION:

Strengthen and further develop the Acceleration Plan for Environmental Human Rights Defenders, recognizing the growing links between organized crime, illicit activities, territorial governance and the protection of forests, Indigenous territories and other ecosystems critical to climate action.

2.5 THE JUST TRANSITION MECHANISM: EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF JUST TRANSITION

Among the formal outcomes of COP30 was the mandate to establish the Just Transition Mechanism (JTM) under the JTWP Decision, which was widely viewed as one of the outcomes with the greatest potential to connect climate policy to the everyday realities of affected communities.

The Mechanism reflects an important evolution in the understanding of just transition. Historically, discussions on just transition have focused primarily on workers and communities dependent on fossil fuel industries. While this remains an important dimension of a just transition, the JTWP Decision incorporates issues related to human rights, labor rights, the rights of Indigenous peoples and Afro-descendant communities, gender

equality, youth, access to energy and development, recognizing that the social consequences of climate action extend far beyond workforce reconversion.

For the first time in a negotiated outcome, the contributions of Indigenous peoples to climate action were expanded beyond the adaptation framework and effectively recognized within the mitigation agenda. The first paragraph of the preamble of the *Mutirão* Decision explicitly recognizes “the rights of Indigenous Peoples, including their land rights and traditional knowledge.”²¹ Together with the broader framework emerging from the JTWP Decision and the Tropical Forest Forever Facility (TFFF), this was presented as an important step toward

²¹ UNFCCC, *Global Mutirão: Uniting humanity in a global mobilization against climate change*, Decision 1/CMA.7, FCCC/PA/CMA/2025/L.24, adopted at COP30, Belém, Brazil, November, 2025. Available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2025_L24E.pdf

strengthening the connection between Indigenous territorial protection, climate finance and climate implementation. In this sense, the unprecedented scale of Indigenous participation throughout the COP30 process was also highlighted. This was viewed as a significant political development, reflecting a broader shift in how Indigenous peoples are positioned within international climate governance. Rather than being engaged primarily as vulnerable communities affected by climate change, Indigenous peoples are increasingly recognized as rights-holders, knowledge-holders and active contributors to climate solutions.

Furthermore, for the first time in the UNFCCC's history, people of African descent were named across multiple strands of negotiated text, including in the *Mutirão* Decision, the JTWP Decision and the Belém GAP. This achievement was described as the result of years of

advocacy by Afro-descendant movements and organizations around the world.

However, advances in negotiated language do not automatically translate into changes on the ground. There is a persistent gap between the growing recognition of Indigenous peoples and local communities within climate negotiations and their limited access to climate finance, noting that less than 1% of climate finance reaches Indigenous territories.²² In this context, TFFF's commitment to allocate 20% of resources to Indigenous peoples and local communities together with the operationalization of the JTM was seen as an important step toward bridging the gap between formal recognition and implementation by creating additional pathways for Indigenous Peoples and local communities to engage with and benefit from just transition initiatives.



RECOMMENDATION:

Sustain and deepen the engagement of Afro-descendant peoples, Indigenous peoples and other historically underrepresented constituencies within the climate regime, ensuring that the recognition achieved at COP30 is translated into durable participation, leadership opportunities and access to resources.

Discussions also highlighted tensions associated with the energy transition itself, particularly the expansion of

critical mineral extraction. Negotiations on the Belém outcome originally included language addressing critical

22. United Nations News, *Indigenous Peoples sidelined in global climate fight, UN warns*, 24 April, 2025. Available at: <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/04/1162601>

minerals and the rights of affected communities, but this text was ultimately not retained in the final decision. As a result, important questions remain regarding consultation, consent and benefit-sharing in areas affected by new mining projects, particularly in Indigenous and traditional territories. More broadly, several interventions stressed that a just transition cannot be understood solely as a mechanism for compensating affected communities.

Instead, Article 12 of the JTWP Decision advances a broader understanding of just transition, emphasizing that the transition must actively support ecosystems, biodiversity, rights, livelihoods and sustainable development pathways, particularly for Indigenous peoples, traditional communities and other groups directly affected by climate and environmental policies.²³ This challenge is particularly evident in regions such as

the Amazon, where many communities already engaged in economic activities linked to forest conservation, biodiversity protection and sustainable resource management remain largely invisible to NDCs and many existing climate finance mechanisms. A riverine community in the Amazon, for example, managing an agroforestry system that effectively sequesters carbon, produces food and generates income for its members, is already delivering many of the outcomes climate policy seeks to achieve. The design of the JTM should help ensure these communities are recognized, supported and able to access the resources necessary to expand their contribution. This would help ensure that existing local models of sustainable development are replicated, rather than focusing exclusively on new transition initiatives or nationally driven projects.



RECOMMENDATION:

Ensure that the design of the Just Transition Mechanism recognizes and supports communities and territories that are already generating climate benefits through activities such as forest conservation, biodiversity protection and sustainable resource management, while strengthening rights, livelihoods and sustainable development pathways and enabling successful local models to be replicated and scaled across other regions.

23. UNFCCC, *United Arab Emirates just transition work programme*, Draft Decision CMA.7, FCCC/PA/CMA/2025/L.14, adopted at COP30, Belém, Brazil. November 21, 2025. Available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2025_L14E.pdf

The four pillars of the Mechanism – enhancing international cooperation, technical assistance, capacity-building and knowledge sharing, and enabling equitable, inclusive just transitions – were generally welcomed. At the same time, the JTM should not become merely another platform for dialogue and reporting, but should contribute directly to tangible support on the ground. For this reason, the ongoing design process is critical. Whether the Mechanism can deliver meaningful outcomes will depend

above all on who can access it and how its financing is structured. Discussions focused in particular on territorial eligibility; the possibility of allowing Indigenous peoples, local communities and subnational governments to access support directly, rather than exclusively through national governments. These considerations will ultimately determine whether the JTM can fulfill its promise of supporting a transition that is socially inclusive and development-oriented.



RECOMMENDATION:

Ensure that the design of the Just Transition Mechanism incorporates territorial eligibility criteria, allowing Indigenous peoples, local communities and subnational governments to access support directly rather than exclusively through national governments.

2.6 GLOBAL GOAL ON ADAPTATION

The Dialogue highlighted the progress under the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), particularly the adoption of 59 indicators intended to support the measurement of adaptation outcomes. This was described as a concrete, though partial, advance in a process that began at COP28 with the agreement on thematic adaptation targets. The next challenge will be translating these indicators into methodologies, national data systems and comparable reporting frameworks. It was emphasized that

adaptation must be “made visible to become financeable.” Unlike mitigation, whose results can often be measured through emissions reductions, adaptation benefits are frequently less tangible and therefore struggle to attract political attention and investment. In this context, the commitment adopted at COP30 to triple adaptation finance by 2035 underscored the need for measurement and reporting systems capable of tracking needs, allocating resources and demonstrating results.



RECOMMENDATION:

Advance the methodologies, data frameworks and national information systems needed to make the Global Goal on Adaptation indicators comparable across countries and capable of supporting continuous monitoring, finance allocation and results-based reporting over time.

Brazil's experience in incorporating GGA indicators into its National Adaptation Plan (NAP), was cited as an example of how global frameworks can be translated into national planning processes. Adaptation should be treated as a cross-cutting responsibility involving multiple ministries and levels of government. Brazil's NAP illustrates this multilevel character by structuring it around nine national objectives and 16 sectoral and thematic plans.²⁴ Its 810 measures are now being implemented in coordination with all states and more than 500 municipalities through the AdaptaCidades initiative, supported by a shared data platform and project bank. This experience was explicitly linked to the Action Agenda's Multilevel

Governance Acceleration Plan and to the CHAMP coalition, reflecting a deliberate effort to connect national adaptation commitments to local implementation.

At the same time, four persistent governance challenges were identified as common to most countries: weak coordination mechanisms across levels of government, institutional fragility at the local level, insufficient local risk-analysis data systems, and limited capacity among local governments to mobilize financing even where it is theoretically available. These challenges illustrate that the effectiveness of adaptation policies ultimately depends on the institutional capacity to implement them across different levels of government.

24. Brazil's Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change, Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation, Office of the President's Chief of Staff. *Climate Plan: Adaptation. National Adaptation Plan*. 2025. Available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Updated-NAP_Brazil_2026_ENG.pdf



RECOMMENDATION:

Treat adaptation as a cross-cutting, multi-ministerial and multilevel responsibility, ensuring that both climate-specific and broader development financing incorporate adaptation considerations into planning, investment and implementation decision-making.

Discussions also emphasized the need to strengthen synergies between adaptation, mitigation and loss and damage, cautioning against approaches that treat these agendas as competing components of climate action. These synergies are not simply a matter of policy coherence, but of climate justice. While mitigation seeks to prevent future harm, adaptation and loss and damage

address the needs of populations already experiencing the consequences of climate change. Adaptation and loss and damage should therefore be understood through the lens of justice and reparation, particularly in relation to communities that have contributed least to climate change yet face its most immediate and severe consequences.



RECOMMENDATION:

Design climate policies, financing mechanisms and implementation frameworks to strengthen synergies between adaptation, mitigation and loss-and-damage, while ensuring that climate action prioritizes and protects populations facing the highest levels of climate vulnerability.

2.7 BREAKING DOWN SILOS: CLIMATE, TRADE AND FINANCE

The existing architecture of global economic governance has not evolved at the same pace as the profound structural transformations reshaping the international economy. The growing importance of industrial policy, technological competition, climate transition and economic resilience is challenging governance frameworks originally developed under different assumptions. As a result, greater coherence between climate, trade and development policies will require continued adaptation of international rules to changing global realities.

A recurring theme throughout the discussions was that many of the obstacles to climate implementation stem from fragmentation across institutions and governance systems. Climate objectives continue to be negotiated separately from trade rules, financial systems, industrial policy and digital governance, despite growing recognition that these agendas are increasingly interdependent. This gap will require not only stronger climate policies but also greater integration across the institutions and sectors that shape economic development.

This challenge is also visible on the national level. The climate targets countries submit through their NDCs frequently differ from those contained in their domestic development plans because environment ministries often operate separately from finance, trade, energy and agriculture ministries.²⁵ A UNCTAD analysis identified 680 measures in 60 developing countries' NDCs with significant trade implications, yet were not explicitly recognized as trade measures, largely because trade ministries had not participated in their design.²⁶ These disconnects reflect institutional structures that remain poorly adapted to the cross-cutting nature of climate action.

The same fragmentation was identified at the international level. Climate and trade continue to be governed through largely separate institutional processes despite their growing interdependence. Yet climate objectives will be difficult to achieve if they rely primarily on dedicated climate finance while remaining disconnected from the far larger economic flows, investment decisions and market incentives shaped by international trade.

25. OECD. *Investing in Climate for Growth and Development: The Case for Enhanced NDCs*. June 10, 2025. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/investing-in-climate-for-growth-and-development_16b7cbc7-en/full-report.html

26. UNCTAD. *Mapping trade-related measures in Nationally Determined Contributions*. December 4, 2023. Available at: <https://unctad.org/publication/mapping-trade-related-measures-nationally-determined-contributions>

Bridging Climate and Trade Governance

The Integrated Forum on Climate Change and Trade (IFCCT), launched within the Action Agenda at COP30, was presented as an attempt to create a dedicated space for dialogue between two regimes that have historically operated in isolation from one another, reducing the risk of generating unnecessary costs, political tensions and conflicting or duplicative requirements. The Forum seeks to address three structural challenges.

First, asymmetry, reflected in the unequal capacity of countries to navigate increasingly complex climate-related trade requirements and participate effectively in emerging green markets. Second, fragmentation, resulting from the proliferation of disconnected standards, reporting requirements and regulatory frameworks that increase costs and uncertainty for governments and businesses alike. Third, institutional paralysis, referring to the limited ability of existing multilateral institutions to develop new rules and address the growing intersection between climate and trade in a coordinated manner. The World Trade Organization was cited as one example, having increasingly struggled to update rules and produce meaningful consensus outcomes. In contrast, climate negotiations, despite significant divisions among Parties, continue to generate new agreements, targets and implementation mechanisms. This is, in part, due to climate diplomacy being anchored in a shared development agenda and operating with clearer scientific deadlines, creating a

greater sense of urgency compared to trade negotiations.

Against this backdrop, the structure of the Forum was designed to respond directly to these challenges and was viewed as an opportunity to strengthen coordination between the climate and trade regimes by bringing together their respective institutions, technical experts and policymakers. The creation of an expert panel and the organization of work around thematic clusters intended to examine the interaction between climate and trade from multiple perspectives, including sustainable agriculture, industrial transformation and climate finance. Some of the most contentious issues at the climate-trade interface are not fundamentally political disagreements but technical coordination problems. Carbon accounting, for example, involves different methodologies, reporting standards and verification systems which create uncertainty and significantly increase compliance costs, even where countries share similar climate objectives. For example, the European Union's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) has raised concerns that, beyond any direct carbon-related costs, firms may also face significant administrative and reporting burdens, particularly where technical capacity to comply is limited. In this context, the Open Coalition on Compliance Carbon Markets²⁷ was highlighted as one initiative seeking greater convergence in

27. The Open Coalition on Compliance Carbon Markets is an international multilateral initiative launched by the European Union, Brazil and China to strengthen and align regulated carbon pricing policies worldwide.

carbon accounting methodologies and market rules.

It was also argued that climate-trade coordination must go beyond carbon accounting alone to address the credibility of green claims, calling for the development of robust green

taxonomies capable of clarifying what qualifies as genuinely low-carbon. Examples cited included the need for common standards for products such as green steel and green hydrogen, allowing decarbonization claims to be verified rather than simply asserted.



RECOMMENDATION:

Use the Integrated Forum on Climate Change and Trade as a bridge between climate and trade regimes, promoting knowledge transfer, technical exchange and convergence on carbon accounting methodologies, green taxonomies, standards and certification frameworks to improve transparency and interoperability across jurisdictions.

A further point raised repeatedly was the need to involve the private sector from the outset of climate-trade dialogue. Many businesses remain disconnected from national climate planning processes and are often unaware of the investment opportunities embedded in countries' NDCs. Bringing private-sector actors into these discussions at an early stage was therefore viewed as essential both to mobilize investment and to ensure that the transition creates opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises, rather than disproportionately benefiting large multinational corporations.

Global challenges ultimately require greater international coordination and interoperability of rules. Therefore, participants cautioned against the proliferation of uncoordinated regional approaches to climate-related trade

issues. They also cautioned against the use of climate measures as disguised forms of protectionism and emphasized the importance of ensuring that emerging climate-related trade rules remain compatible with development objectives and equitable participation in international markets. Therefore, the Forum should not be framed as a new negotiating body for creating new trade restrictions, but as a platform for dialogue and coordination. Other existing initiatives that rely on voluntary pathways to promote greater interoperability include the G20 and the Baku Initiative for Climate Finance, Investment and Trade (BICFIT), which were also identified as potentially important vehicles for advancing this work and fostering greater alignment across jurisdictions.



RECOMMENDATIONS:

- ▲ Ensure that existing and emerging climate-related trade measures remain compatible with development objectives and equitable participation in international markets, avoiding their use as disguised forms of protectionism or unnecessary barriers to trade.
- ▲ Ensure early and meaningful private-sector engagement in climate-trade coordination, including small and medium-sized enterprises, to help mobilize investment, identify opportunities linked to NDC implementation and avoid transition benefits being captured primarily by large multinational corporations.

Discussions also examined the implications of these developments for the Global South. Participants warned of the risk of a new “climate-development trap,” whereby countries are expected to decarbonize while remaining locked into unequal positions within global value chains. The green transition risks reproducing new forms of dependency if developing countries continue to export raw materials while higher-value manufacturing and technological capabilities remain concentrated elsewhere. Industrial policy, once viewed with skepticism in many international economic discussions, was increasingly described as a legitimate and necessary tool for enabling countries to capture a larger share of the transition’s benefits, particularly for countries with fewer natural renewable energy advantages, through measures such as procurement

policies and domestic sourcing requirements. Government procurement alone can represent up to 22% of GDP in many economies, highlighting its potential to shape investment patterns.²⁸ South-South trade and greater regional coordination were also identified as important opportunities, particularly in Latin America, where a persistent deficit of regional coordination remains despite significant complementarities.

In addition, Chinese investment has become an increasingly important driver of low-carbon development across many countries, including Brazil, with a significant share directed toward electricity infrastructure and electric vehicle production. This example was used to illustrate both the opportunities and challenges associated with the green transition. While such investments

28. World Bank. *Procurement for Development*. April 14, 2020. Available at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/procurement-for-development>

can accelerate industrial development and technology diffusion, it is only a benefit if it also builds local value and domestic technological capability, rather than simply substituting one external dependency for another.

It was also observed that the reduction in the cost of solar panels driven by

Chinese manufacturing may have contributed more to the energy transition in developing countries than many traditional forms of official development assistance. This highlights the importance of expanded access to affordable clean energy technologies, particularly in developing countries.



RECOMMENDATION:

Use public policy tools, such as industrial policy, public procurement, domestic sourcing measures and support for local and regional production, to help developing countries capture greater value from the green transition, strengthen domestic technological capabilities and avoid new forms of dependency within global value chains.

The growing intersection between digitalization and climate governance was identified as another emerging area where institutional fragmentation remains significant. Despite rapidly increasing energy demands associated with artificial intelligence, data centers and digital infrastructure, the emissions implications of the digital transition remain largely absent from current multilateral governance frameworks. While digital technologies are expected to play an important role in climate solutions, concerns were raised that unequal access to digital infrastructure and technological capabilities could create new forms of inequality unless

accompanied by appropriate governance arrangements. These asymmetries are reinforced by broader structural barriers within the international economy. Existing trade and intellectual property regimes have often struggled to accommodate development objectives, with technological knowledge remaining concentrated through patent protections and other mechanisms that can limit access for developing countries. As a result, the digital transition risks becoming a new source of asymmetry unless accompanied by efforts to expand technological diffusion, strengthen domestic capabilities and improve access to critical technologies.



RECOMMENDATION:

Align digital and climate policy frameworks to address the emissions impacts of artificial intelligence and digital infrastructure, while ensuring that digitalization supports equitable and low-carbon development pathways rather than reinforcing existing asymmetries.

Climate Finance, Fiscal Space and Industrial Transformation

Discussions about trade competitiveness, industrial transformation and climate implementation ultimately converge on questions of investment and public finance. While private capital has an important role to play, it was cautioned against assuming that markets alone will deliver the scale of transformation required. Public finance, long-term state

planning and industrial strategies were identified as essential components of successful transitions. In this sense, proposals such as the United Nations Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation were noted as examples of efforts to expand the fiscal space available for sustainable development.



RECOMMENDATIONS:

- ▲ Pursue international tax cooperation mechanisms, including within the scope of the UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation, to expand the fiscal space available for sustainable development financing.
- ▲ Strengthen public finance, fiscal capacity and long-term industrial strategies as central pillars of the climate transition, while mobilizing private capital in ways that complement public investment.

The Dialogue also revealed a growing inconsistency in contemporary fiscal debates. Several European countries, despite previously emphasizing fiscal discipline, have recently relaxed budgetary constraints to expand military spending and domestic arms production. This was cited as evidence that fiscal rules are ultimately political choices rather than fixed economic constraints. If fiscal flexibility can be mobilized in support of security objectives, similar flexibility could be justified to finance green industrial policies, climate resilience and broader sustainable development goals.

Climate finance must go beyond mobilizing additional resources to redirect capital that is already flowing toward environmentally harmful activities. The scale of the transition requires changes in the incentives and financial architectures that shape investment decisions across the economy. The scale of the current misalignment is considerable. For every dollar invested globally in protecting nature, roughly thirty dollars continue to flow into activities that degrade ecosystems, a ratio driven in large part by environmentally harmful subsidies

and private investment in sectors such as fossil fuels and intensive agriculture.²⁹ In this regard, the engagement of Brazil's Ministry of Finance with the climate agenda, including initiatives such as the TFFF, the Open Coalition on Compliance Carbon Markets, country platforms, the Brazilian Sustainable Taxonomy³⁰ and the Eco Invest Brasil program³¹ was viewed as a significant development and cited as evidence of a broader effort to integrate climate objectives into economic and financial policymaking rather than treating them as a sectoral environmental concern.

Discussions throughout the Dialogue underscored that climate policy can no longer be treated as a siloed policy area. The implementation challenge increasingly lies at the intersection of climate, trade, finance, technology and development. The institutions governing these domains have not evolved at the same pace as the problems they are expected to address, making greater policy integration one of the central governance challenges of the coming decade.

29. United Nations Environment Programme, *State of Finance for Nature 2026: Nature in the Red: Powering the Trillion Dollar Nature Transition Economy*, January 22, 2026. Available at: <https://www.unep.org/resources/state-finance-nature-2026>

30. The Brazilian Sustainable Taxonomy provides a framework for classifying economic activities and investments according to their contribution to climate, environmental and social objectives.

31. Eco Invest Brasil is a Brazilian foreign capital mobilization and currency hedging program, designed to attract international and domestic private investment for the country's ecological transformation.

3. CLOSING REFLECTIONS



The Global Policy Dialogue closed with a reflection on the broader moment in which climate governance now operates. The discussions highlighted the growing need for a narrative of cooperation at a time when competition has become the dominant feature of international affairs, together with a shared responsibility to carry that lesson back into institutions, networks and territories. Recalling that the proliferation of international regimes and institutions since the 1992 Earth Summit, held in Rio de Janeiro, was a deliberate effort to distribute governance across different cities and communities

of expertise around the world. What was once seen as a strength of the international system has gradually created a new challenge. Three decades later, the task facing climate governance is no longer the creation of new institutions but the rebuilding of connections between those that already exist. Whether that effort succeeds will depend less on any single mechanism examined in this report than on the willingness of institutions, governments and practitioners to reconnect agendas that too often continue to operate in isolation and to translate commitments into implementation.

ABOUT PLATAFORMA CIPÓ

Plataforma CIPÓ is a Brazil-based international relations think tank dedicated to advancing climate action, sustainable development and global governance reform, with a focus on the priorities of the Global South. CIPÓ develops evidence-based research and promotes dialogue and coordination between multiple actors to enhance governance and shape public policies for just transitions, connecting the local to the global.

The following team led the Global Policy Dialogue 2026 and its summary report:



Maiara Folly

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We are especially grateful to the Government of the State of Bahia and to the Interstate Consortium for the Sustainable Development of the Northeast, especially its Executive Secretary, Carlos Gabas, for their partnership in making this edition of the Global Policy Dialogue possible and for helping ground the discussions in the Northeast's own implementation priorities and experiences.

We also thank the Institute for Climate and Society (iCS), the Climate Emergency Collaboration Group, the Global Challenges Foundation, the Embassy of France in Brazil, the Heinrich Böll Foundation and the Global Governance Innovation Network for their invaluable support throughout the process.

This edition of the Dialogue was distinguished, once again, by the direct engagement of the COP30 Presidency. We express our deepest appreciation to the COP30 President, His Excellency Ambassador André Corrêa do Lago, for his active and generous participation throughout the Dialogue, and to the wider COP30 Presidency team for their candor in reflecting on the Conference's legacy and the work ahead.

We are equally grateful to Her Excellency Sônia Guajajara, Federal Deputy and former Minister of Indigenous

Peoples of Brazil, whose presence and leadership underscored the central place of Indigenous knowledge and rights in advancing just transitions and strengthening global climate governance.

We also acknowledge the Brazilian Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change, the Ministry of Indigenous Peoples of Brazil, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for their engagement throughout the Dialogue, which provided participants with a rare integrated view of how COP30's legacy is being carried forward across the institutions responsible for delivering it. We extend the same appreciation to the negotiators and senior officials from other governments who enriched the Dialogue by sharing first-hand perspectives from the negotiations.

We further recognize the significance of welcoming representatives of the incoming COP31 and COP32 Presidencies to the Dialogue: His Excellency Ambassador Halil İbrahim Akça of Türkiye, Her Excellency Gabrielle Hall, Consul-General and Trade and Investment Commissioner of Australia, and His Excellency Ambassador Leulseged Tadese Abebe of Ethiopia. Their presence reflected a shared commitment to carrying the legacy of Belém forward into the next cycles of multilateral climate governance.

Finally, we wish to thank every participant who traveled to Salvador, Bahia, to share their knowledge, experience and insights, and whose contributions form the foundation of this report.

ANNEX 1: PARTICIPANT LIST

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Alejandra López	Head of Climate Diplomacy, Transforma Global
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Allyson Maynard-Gibson	Chair of the University of the Bahamas Attorney General and Minister of Legal Affairs of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas (2012-2017) Club de Madrid Advisor
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André Corrêa do Lago	President, COP30
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Andrea Ordóñez	Senior Adviser, Green Industrial Policy, Global Cooperation Institute
Andréia Coutinho	Executive Director, Brazilian Center for Climate Justice
Aude Darnal	Incoming Executive Director, Global South Policy Hub
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Carolina Grottera	Undersecretary for Ecological Transformation, Ministry of Finance of Brazil
Caroline Rocha	Executive Director, Latin American Climate Lawyers Initiative for Mobilizing Action (LACLIMA)
Celio Hiratuka	Director of the Institute of Economics, State University of Campinas (Unicamp)
Chantal Line Carpentier	Head of Trade, Environment, Climate Change and Sustainable Development, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
Daniela Prioli	Senior Programme Manager, Porticus Latin America
Daniela Vargas	Programme Management Officer, Office of the UN Secretary-General
Daniella Fernandes	Director-General, Secretariat of the Environment of the State of Bahia
Dawid Bartelt	Head of Office, Heinrich Böll Stiftung Türkiye
Diego Casaes	Program Director, Climate Emergency Collaboration Group
Edgard Gouveia Junior	Co-Chair of the Programme Committee, Global Activism Movement
Eduardo Sodr� Martins	State Secretary for the Environment, Government of the State of Bahia
Eduardo Zanatta	City Councilor for the municipality of Balne�rio Cambori� (Santa Catarina - Brazil)
Elizabetta Albernaz	Institutional Strategies and Engagement, Institute for Climate and Society (ICS)
Ethel Maciel	Professor, Federal University of Esp�rito Santo (UFES) Special Envoy of COP30 for Health
Ester Coelho	Public Policy Analyst, Australian Embassy in Brazil
Fernanda Carvalho	Head of Policy for Climate and Energy, World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF)
Fl�via Bellaguarda	Extraordinary Advisor for COP30, Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change of Brazil (MMA)
Flora Botelho	Intern, Plataforma CIP�
Francisco Segovia	Programme Officer, Club de Madrid
Gabriela de Souza Oliveira	Programme Management Officer, Brazil Office, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
Gabrielle Hall	Consul-General and Commissioner, Consulate General of Australia in S�o Paulo (Brazil)
Giancarlo Gama	Climate and Economy Manager, Council for Sustainable Economic and Social Development (CDESS)

Glauber Piva	Chief of Staff, Northeast Consortium
Gopalika Arora	Deputy Director, Observer Research Foundation (ORF)
Guilherme Patriota	Permanent Representative of Brazil to the World Trade Organization (WTO)
Halil İbrahim Akça	Turkish Ambassador to Brazil
Iago Hairon	Global Program Manager and Brazil Lead - Economic Prosperity, Open Society Foundations (OSF)
Igor Loiola	Operations and Events Coordinator, Plataforma CIPÓ
Inamara Melo	Director of Adaptation and Resilience Policies, Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change of Brazil (MMA)
Isabela Rahal	Programme Manager, Climate Emergency Collaboration Group
Javier Aliaga Lordemann	Advisory Committee, Southern Voices
Geraldo Junior	Vice-Governor of the State of Bahia
João Cerqueira	Director, 350.org
João Cumarú	International Advisor, Northeast Consortium
Jordan McLean	Project and Knowledge Manager, Southern Transitions
Jorge Calvimontes	Senior Researcher, Plataforma CIPÓ
Juan Acuña-Roman	Project Manager, Transition Observatory at IE University
Jurema Werneck	Special Envoy of COP30 for Racial equality and marginalized urban communities Executive Director, Amnesty International Brazil
Lara Ramos	Program and Public Policy Coordinator, World-Transforming Technologies (WTT)
Laura Meza Morales	Regional Liaison Officer for Latin America and the Caribbean, United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD)
Laura Elisa de Souza	Researcher, Plataforma CIPÓ
Laura Restrepo Alameda	Advocacy Officer, Climate Action Network Latin America (CANLA)
Laurent Javaudin	Advisor for Climate, Energy, Environment and Health, Delegation of the European Union in Brazil
Leonel Neto	Local Project Coordinator for Bahia State, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
Leulseged Tadese Abebe	Ethiopian Ambassador to Brazil
Luciana Servo	President, Institute of Applied Economic Research (Ipea)
Luiz Araujo	Superintendent of Environmental Policy and Planning, Secretariat of the Environment of the State of Bahia

Luiza Lima	Diplomacy Officer - Latin America and the Caribbean, Global Gas & Oil Network
Maiara Folly	Co-founder and Executive Director, Plataforma CIPÓ
Malango Mughogho	Director, ZeniZeni
Maiana Pitombo	Superintendent of Innovation and Environmental Development, Secretariat of the Environment of the State of Bahia
Marcele Oliveira	Youth Climate Champion, COP30 Presidency
Marcelo Montenegro	Programs and Projects Coordinator for Socio-Environmental Justice, Heinrich Böll Foundation
Marco Rocha	Executive Director, Transforma Economia Unicamp
Mariana de Paula	Executive Director, Decodifica Institute
Mariana Franco Ramos	Communications Coordinator, Plataforma CIPÓ
Mariana Rondon	Deputy Executive Director for Programs, Plataforma CIPÓ
Mariana Mascarenhas	Coordinator of the Executive Secretariat of Environmental Councils, Secretariat of the Environment of the State of Bahia
Mariano Castro Sánchez-Moreno	Director, Resilient and Just Amazon Initiative Vice Minister of Environmental Management of Peru (2011-2016 and 2021-2022) Vice President of the first United Nations Environment Assembly
Marília Closs	Projects and Research Coordinator, Plataforma CIPÓ
Mirey Atallah	Chief of the Adaptation and Resilience Branch, Climate Change Division, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
Mulugeta Getu	Lead Researcher and Department Head, Policy Studies Institute (PSI)
Nastassja Hoffet	Global Affairs Advisor, French Embassy in Brazil
Nathalie Beghin	Member of the Management Board, Institute for Socioeconomic Studies (Inesc)
Nayra Paye Kaxuyana	Technical Advisor, Ministry of Indigenous Peoples
Natália Oliveira	Coordinator of International Cooperation, Government of the State of Bahia
Nimaya Mallikahewa	Third Secretary, Australian Embassy, Brasília
Nycolas Candido	Researcher, Plataforma CIPÓ
Olívia Maria Cordeiro de Oliveira	Research Coordinator, Vice-Rectorate for Research and Graduate Studies, Federal University of Bahia (UFBA)
Paul Watkinson	High-Level Multilateral Facilitator and Negotiator Former Chair of the UNFCCC's Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA)

Paulo Petersen	Special Envoy for Family Farming at COP30 Director and Executive Coordinator, AS-PTA Family Farming and Agroecology
Pedro Nascimento	Brazilian Negotiator for Just Transition, Climate Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Philipe Alexandre Junqueira	Executive Advisor, Plataforma CIPÓ
Piyush Verma	Senior Fellow and Head of Energy and Climate Policy, Observer Research Foundation America (ORF America)
Priscila Papagiannis	Coordinator of the Environment and Climate Working Group, Brazilian Network for the Integration of Peoples (REBRIP)
Rafael Freire	Coordinator, Bahia Environmentalist Group (GAMBA)
Regine Schönenberg	Director, Heinrich Böll Foundation
Renata Neder	Senior Programme Officer, Climate and Land Use Alliance (CLUA)
Rosana Santos	Executive Director, The E+ Energy Transition Institute
Sarang Shidore	Director, Global South Program, Quincy Institute
Sergio Xavier	Special Envoy of COP30 for Brazilian Climate Change Forum (FBMC) Executive Coordinator, Brazilian Forum on Climate Change
Shuva Raha	Fellow and Lead - International Cooperation, Council on Energy, Environment and Water (CEEW)
Sônia Guajajara	Minister of Indigenous Peoples of Brazil (2022-2026) COP30 People's Circle Brazilian Federal Deputy
Tatiana Yokozawa	Senior Policy Officer, Australian Embassy, Brasília
Thaís dos Santos Domingos	Communication Assistant, Plataforma CIPÓ
Thaynah Gutierrez	International Advisor on Climate and Environmental Racism, Geledés - Institute of Black Women
Tiago Porto	Director of Environmental Policy and Planning, Secretariat of the Environment of the State of Bahia
Tulio Andrade	Strategy and Alignment Director, COP30 Presidency
Tulio Cariello	Content and Research Director, Brazil-China Business Council
Vitor Vaz	Deputy Head for Climate Action, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil
Vitória Gonzalez	Programs Coordinator, Plataforma CIPÓ
Wang Mou	Professor and Secretary-General, Research Center for Sustainable Development, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

ANNEX 2: GLOBAL POLICY DIALOGUE 2026 PROGRAMME

SUNDAY, MAY 24			
19h30 - 22h	Welcome reception and dinner		
MONDAY, MAY 25			
Schedule	Sessions	Speakers / Discussants	Moderators
7h45 - 8h10	Registration session		
8h15 - 8h35 (20 min)	Opening Session and Welcome Remarks	Maiara Folly , Executive Director, Plataforma CIPÓ Carlos Gabas , Executive Secretary, Northeast Consortium Geraldo Junior , Vice-Governor of the State of Bahia	Maiara Folly , Executive Director, Plataforma CIPÓ
8h40 - 10h (80 min)	<u>Session 1</u> Taking Stock of COP30: Reflections from the Presidency	<i>Special Addresses:</i> Ambassador André Corrêa do Lago , COP30 President; and Sônia Guajajara , Minister of Indigenous Peoples of Brazil (2022-2026) COP30 People's Circle Brazilian Federal Deputy Túlio Andrade , Director of Strategy and Alignment, COP30 Presidency Bruna Cerqueira , General Coordinator of the Action Agenda, COP30 Presidency Marcele Oliveira , Presidency Youth Climate Champion for COP30 Flávia Bellaguarda , Extraordinary Advisor for COP30, Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change of Brazil	Maiara Folly , Executive Director, Plataforma CIPÓ
10h30 - 10h45	Coffee Break		
10h45 - 12h (90 min)	<u>Session 2</u> From Commitments to Implementation: the Legacy of COP30	<i>Special Address:</i> Andrea Meza Murillo , Deputy Executive Secretary United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) Minister of Environment of Costa Rica (2020-2022) Alexandra Moreira , Secretary-General, Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (2019-2024) Minister of Environment and Water of Bolivia (2015-2017) Pedro Nascimento , Ministry of External Relations of Brazil UNFCCC negotiator Wang Mou , Professor and Secretary General, Research Center for Sustainable Development, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences UNFCCC negotiator ▶	Diego Casaes , Program Director, Climate Emergency Collaboration Group

Schedule	Sessions	Speakers / Discussants	Moderators
10h45 - 12h (90 min)	<u>Session 2</u> From Commitments to Implementation: the Legacy of COP30	Carolina Grottera, Undersecretary for Ecological Transformation, Ministry of Finance of Brazil Inamara Melo, Director of Adaptation and Resilience Policies, Ministry of Environment and Climate Change of Brazil Nayra Paye Kaxuyana, Technical Advisor, Ministry of Indigenous Peoples of Brazil Jurema Werneck, Special Envoy of COP30 for Racial equality and marginalized urban communities Executive Director, Amnesty International Brazil <i>COP30 Discussant:</i> Bruna Cerqueira, General Coordinator of the Action Agenda, COP30 Presidency <i>Discussants:</i> Thaynah Gutierrez, International Advisor on Climate and Environmental Racism, Geledes Black Women's Institute	Diego Casaes , Program Director, Climate Emergency Collaboration Group
12h - 12h15	Group Photo		
12h15 - 13h45	Lunch		
14h - 15h30 (90 min)	<u>Session 3</u> Reforming Climate Governance Toward a Two-Level Multilateralism	<i>Special Addresses:</i> Paul Watkinson, High-Level Multilateral Facilitator and Negotiator Former Chair of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) of the UNFCCC; and Wang Mou, Professor and Secretary General, Research Center for Sustainable Development, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences UNFCCC negotiator Daniela Vargas, Executive Office of the United Nations Secretary-General Mirey Atallah, Chief of the Adaptation and Resilience Branch, Climate Change Division, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Allyson Maynard-Gibson, Chair of the University of the Bahamas Attorney General and Minister of Legal Affairs of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas (2012-2017) Club de Madrid Advisor Mariano Castro Sánchez-Moreno, Director, Resilient and Just Amazon Initiative Vice Minister of Environmental Management of Peru (2011-2016 and 2021-2022) Vice President of the first United Nations Environment Assembly <i>COP30 Discussant:</i> Túlio Andrade, Director of Strategy and Alignment, COP30 Presidency <i>Discussants:</i> Aude Darnal, Executive Director, Global South Policy Hub Mariana de Paula, Executive Director, Decodifica Institute	Fernanda Carvalho , Head of Policy - Climate and Energy, WWF

15h40 - 16h50 (70 min)	Breakout Groups - Session 1 Lead-off speakers will present the key objectives and priorities within their respective thematic areas, followed by a group discussion on how to operationalize and advance these priorities.		
	<i>Breakout group 1</i> Climate and Trade <i>Âmbar Room</i>	<i>Lead-off Speaker:</i> Vitor Vaz , Deputy Head of Climate Action, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil	<i>Moderator:</i> Chantal Line Carpentier , Head of Trade, Environment, Climate Change and Sustainable Development, UNCTAD
	<i>Breakout group 2</i> COP30 Presidency Roadmaps <i>Ônix Room</i>	<i>Lead-off Speaker:</i> Flávia Bellaguarda , Extraordinary Advisor for COP30, Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change of Brazil	<i>Moderator:</i> Camila Jardim , Specialist in International and Climate Politics, Greenpeace Brazil
	<i>Breakout group 3</i> Climate Governance Reform <i>Ametista Room</i>	<i>Lead-off Speaker:</i> Túlio Andrade , Director of Strategy and Alignment, COP30 Presidency	<i>Moderator:</i> Fernanda Carvalho , Head of Policy - Climate and Energy, WWF
	<i>Breakout group 4</i> Action Agenda <i>Esmeralda Hall</i>	<i>Lead-off Speaker:</i> Bruna Cerqueira , General Coordinator of the Action Agenda, COP30 Presidency	<i>Moderator:</i> Alejandra Lopez , Head of Climate Diplomacy, Transforma Global
16h50 - 17h	Short break Coffee and snacks served inside the rooms; discussions will continue throughout.		
17h - 18h10 (70 min)	Breakout Groups - Session 2		
	<i>Breakout group 1</i> Climate and Trade <i>Âmbar Room</i>	<i>Lead-off Speaker:</i> Gabriela Oliveira , Programme Management Officer, Brazil Office, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)	<i>Moderator:</i> Chantal Line Carpentier , Head of Trade, Environment, Climate Change and Sustainable Development, UNCTAD
	<i>Breakout group 2</i> COP30 Presidency Roadmaps <i>Ônix Room</i>	André Guimarães , Executive Director, Amazon Environmental Research Institute (IPAM) Civil Society Special Envoy for COP30; and Paulo Petersen , Special Envoy for Family Farming at COP30 Director and Executive Coordinator, AS-PTA Family Farming and Agroecology	<i>Moderator:</i> Camila Jardim , Specialist in International and Climate Politics, Greenpeace Brazil

17h - 18h10 (70 min)	<i>Breakout group 3</i> Climate Governance Reform <i>Ametista Room</i>	<i>Lead-off Speaker:</i> Paul Watkinson , High-Level Multilateral Facilitator and Negotiator Former Chair of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) of the UNFCCC	<i>Moderator:</i> Fernanda Carvalho , Head of Policy - Climate and Energy, WWF
	<i>Breakout group 4</i> Action Agenda <i>Esmeralda Hall</i>	<i>Lead-off Speaker:</i> Marcele Oliveira , COP30 Presidency Youth Climate Champion	<i>Moderator:</i> Alejandra Lopez , Head of Climate Diplomacy, Transforma Global
18h15 - 18h30	Transfer from the Conference Venue to Bahia Art Museum		
18h30 - 21h15	Cocktail Reception with Cultural Performance		
21h15	Transfer from the Bahia Art Museum to the Hotel		

TUESDAY, MAY 26			
Schedule	Sessions	Speakers / Discussants	Moderators
8h - 9h (60 min)	<i>Session 4</i> The Road Ahead: Strategies and Priorities for COP31, COP32 and the Future of Climate Multilateralism	Ambassador André Corrêa do Lago , COP30 President Halil İbrahim Akça , Ambassador of Türkiye to Brazil Gabrielle Hall , Consul-General and Trade and Investment Commissioner in Sao Paulo, Brazil Leulseged Tadesse Abebe , Ambassador of Ethiopia to Brazil Discussants: Flávia Bellaguarda , Extraordinary Advisor for COP30, Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change of Brazil Mulugeta Getu , Lead Researcher and Department Head, Policy Studies Institute (PSI)	Ambassador Carlos Lazary , Head of Institutional Relations, Plataforma CIPÓ Executive Director, Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (2019-2024) Ambassador of Brazil to Peru (2011-2015) and Ecuador (2015-2018)
9h - 10h30 (60 min)	<i>Session 5</i> A New Economy for the Climate: Breaking Down Silos Across Climate, Finance and Trade	<i>Special Address:</i> Ambassador Guilherme Patriota , Permanent Representative of Brazil to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Chantal Line Carpentier , Head of Trade, Environment, Climate Change and Sustainable Development, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Vitor Vaz , Deputy Head of Climate Action, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil Luciana Servo , President, Institute for Applied Economic Research (Ipea) ▶	Iago Hairon , Global Program Manager and Brazil Lead - Economic Prosperity, Open Society Foundations

Schedule	Sessions	Speakers / Discussants	Moderators
9h - 10h30 (60 min)	<i>Session 5</i> A New Economy for the Climate: Breaking Down Silos Across Climate, Finance and Trade	Adriana Abdenur , Co-president, Global Fund for a New Economy Tulio Cariello , Content and Research Director, Brazil-China Business Council Celio Hiratuka , Director of the Institute of Economics, State University of Campinas <i>COP30 Discussant:</i> Ambassador André Corrêa do Lago , COP30 President <i>Discussants:</i> Malango Mughogho , Managing Director, ZeniZeni Sustainable Finance Piyush Verma , Senior Fellow and Head of Energy and Climate Policy, ORF America	Iago Hairon , Global Program Manager and Brazil Lead - Economic Prosperity, Open Society Foundations
10h30 - 11h	Coffee Break		
11h - 12h (60 min)	Breakout Groups - Session 3		
	<i>Breakout group 1</i> Climate and Trade <i>Âmbar Room</i>	<i>Lead-off Speaker:</i> Celio Hiratuka , Director of the Institute of Economics, State University of Campinas	<i>Moderator:</i> Chantal Line Carpentier , Head of Trade, Environment, Climate Change and Sustainable Development, UNCTAD
	<i>Breakout group 2</i> COP30 Presidency Roadmaps <i>Ônix Room</i>	<i>Lead-off Speaker:</i> Luiza Lima , Diplomacy Officer, Global Gas & Oil Network	<i>Moderator:</i> Camila Jardim , Specialist in International and Climate Politics, Greenpeace Brazil
	<i>Breakout group 3</i> Climate Governance Reform <i>Ametista Room</i>	<i>Lead-off speaker:</i> Caroline Rocha , Executive Director, LACLIMA (Latin American Climate Lawyers Initiative for Mobilizing Action)	<i>Moderator:</i> Fernanda Carvalho , Head of Policy - Climate and Energy, WWF
	<i>Breakout group 4</i> Action Agenda <i>Esmeralda Hall</i>	<i>Lead-off speakers:</i> Inamara Melo , Director of Adaptation and Resilience Policies, Ministry of Environment and Climate Change of Brazil; and Sergio Xavier , Special Envoy of COP30 for Brazilian Climate Change Forum (FBMC) Executive Coordinator, FBMC	<i>Moderator:</i> Alejandra Lopez , Head of Climate Diplomacy, Transforma Global

Schedule	Sessions	Speakers / Discussants	Moderators
12h - 13h	Lunch		
13h05 - 13h50 (45 min)	Closing Plenary Session of the Breakout Groups Presentation of the Breakout Groups' Conclusions (7 min per group presentation, followed by a Q&A session)	<i>Representatives of the Breakout Groups:</i> Chantal Line Carpentier , Head of Trade, Environment, Climate Change and Sustainable Development, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Camila Jardim , Specialist in International and Climate Politics, Greenpeace Brazil Fernanda Carvalho , Head of Policy - Climate and Energy, WWF Alejandra Lopez , Head of Climate Diplomacy, Transforma Global	Shuva Raha , Fellow and Lead at International Cooperation, Council on Energy, Environment and Water (CEEW)
14h - 14h15 (15 min)	Closing Ceremony	Diego Casaes , Program Director, Climate Emergency Collaboration Group Elizabetta Albernaz , Lead of Institutional Strategies and Engagement, Institute for Climate and Society (ICS) Nastassja Hoffet , Global Affairs Advisor, French Embassy in Brazil Regine Schönenberg , Director, Heinrich Böll Foundation Office in Rio de Janeiro Maiara Folly , Executive Director, Plataforma CIPÓ	Maiara Folly , Executive Director, Plataforma CIPÓ



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