FROM COMMITMENTS TO RESULTS: STRENGTHENING THE G20’S ROLE IN PROMOTING GLOBAL CLIMATE ACTION

Alessandra Beber Castilho
Maiara Folly
Marianna Albuquerque
Beatriz Mattos
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The escalating challenges associated with climate change have become a primary concern for the international community. Acknowledging that responding to the climate emergency requires actions that go beyond domestic policies, states have sought to enhance international cooperation to address pressing collective needs, including in areas such as climate financing. Originally established as a forum to address economic challenges, the G20 has gradually expanded its mandate to tackle broader global governance issues that demand a coordinated response. As a forum where developing and developed countries coexist, and decisions are taken by consensus, the grouping has become an important space to promote responses to planetary challenges.

Against this backdrop, this policy brief examines how the G20 has dealt with climate issues since 2008, focusing on both the political attention dedicated to the topic and its incorporation into the group’s institutional frameworks. It does so in two principal ways. First, it maps how often the terms ‘climate’ and ‘climate change’ have been mentioned in the G20 Leaders’ Declaration, identifying patterns over time. Second, it analyses the agenda and outputs produced in the scope of three G20 Working Groups (WGs) dedicated to climate-related issues: the Sustainable Finance Working Group (SFWG); the Environment and Climate Sustainability Working Group (ECSWG); and the Energy Transitions Working Group (ETWG). By doing so, this policy brief seeks to identify progress and gaps in the G20’s ability to promote climate action.

The brief concludes by providing recommendations on how the G20 could improve the efficacy, coordination, and accountability of its climate-related pledges and initiatives, ensuring that the group is better equipped to support existing global governance institutions in implementing the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Paris Agreement. The recommendations provided include:

1. ESTABLISHING A PERMANENT G20 BODY FOR CLIMATE ACTION

The G20 should build upon the work of the temporary Task Force on a Global Mobilisation Against Climate Change (TF-CLIMA) created by the Brazilian G20 presidency to establish a permanent body for climate action that encompasses both the Sherpa and Finance Tracks. The mandate of this proposed framework could include, among other priorities defined by G20 members:
• Mainstreaming climate throughout the working agenda of all G20 WGs to ensure a systematic integration of climate considerations into the strategies and priorities advanced by the G20 Sherpa and Finance Tracks;

• Coordinating, establishing dialogue, and promoting complementarity between Sherpa and Finance Tracks’ WGs addressing climate-related issues;

• Monitoring the implementation of climate-related commitments established in the G20 Leaders’ Declaration, and publicly reporting findings on an annual basis to improve transparency and accountability of the G20 climate pledges;

• Establishing regular and predictable dialogue with G20 engagement groups addressing climate-related issues, such as the T20 and the C20, to formally gather inputs and recommendations from civil society, think tanks, and other relevant groups in a more structured manner, moving away from sporadic and ad hoc approaches.

2. ALIGNING THE G20 CLIMATE AGENDA AND ITS INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE REFORM EFFORTS WITH THE UNFCCC’S PRIORITIES

Although the UNFCCC has the legitimacy and the mandate to propose collective commitments against the climate crisis, financial institutions and the G20 can have a complementary – and not overlapping – role to ensure that climate and financial flows and commitments evolve hand-in-hand. Such an alignment can be advanced – preferably by the above-recommended permanent G20 climate body – in two main ways, such as by:

• Creating a regular channel of communication and dialogue between the G20 Troika and the UNFCCC’s Conference of the Parties’ Presidencies Troika to ensure robust and continuous G20 support for COP Presidencies’ efforts to advance the Roadmap to Mission 1.5°C, a mechanism designed “to significantly enhance international cooperation and the international enabling environment to stimulate ambition” in the next round of nationally determined contributions.

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with a view to enhancing action and implementation over this critical decade and keeping 1.5°C within reach.”

• Promoting a regular channel of dialogue and information exchange meetings between the G20, international financial institutions (IFIs) and the UNFCCC Secretariat to:

  a) explore and advance the G20 and IFI’s role in mobilising the means of implementation in the form of finance, capacity building, and technology transfer, to promote the effective implementation of the UNFCCC and its Paris Agreement;

  b) ensure the alignment of all G20 climate-relevant WGs’ agenda, outputs, commitments, and international financial architecture reform efforts with the principles enshrined in the UNFCCC, especially the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC);

  c) promote a greater balance within the G20’s climate-related work, placing increased attention on traditionally overlooked areas of the UNFCCC agenda, such as climate adaptation and loss and damage.

1. INTRODUCTION

The planet is grappling with an escalating climate crisis, whose effects are increasingly manifesting themselves in every corner of the globe, with developing countries experiencing them more severely. To respond to these challenges, in 2015 a total of 195 states gathered under the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and adopted the Paris Agreement. Since then, the implementation of greenhouse gas emission reduction targets, known as the nationally determined contributions (NDCs), has fallen significantly short, and the uncoordinated and insufficient response to the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated setbacks in the pursuit of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) across their three pillars: social, economic, and environmental.


3. The G20 should not only focus on increasing the quantity of climate finance but also, as emphasised by Mukund and Kabra, strive to enhance the qualitative aspects of these financial flows. For more on this, please see: Mukund, Aditi; Kabra, Namrata. “Towards Inclusive Climate Multilateralism: An Opportunity for the G20” Policy brief presented at the T20 Task Force 7: Towards Reformed Multilateralism: Transforming Global Institutions and Frameworks. India, 2023, https://www.global-solutions-initiative.org/task_force/tf-7-towards-reformed-multilateralism-transforming-global-institutions-and-frameworks/.
Part of this problem is financial in nature. Two years after the original goal, in 2022 developed countries may have fulfilled their overdue promise to allocate the already insufficient annual sum of US$ 100 billion for climate finance. While the global financial architecture has proven inadequate in generating responses that effectively foster climate action and advance implementation of the SDGs, developing nations have experienced a rise in public debt rates, along with growing demands for addressing social needs, climate mitigation and adaptation, as well as compensation for losses and damages.

Another challenge relates to governance. The world has been witnessing a proliferation of global initiatives that often overlap, have insufficient interaction levels, and can cause political dispersion. In addition, the broad thematic and programmatic scope of issue-specific institutions and initiatives poses challenges to the effective implementation of their mandate, highlighting the importance of cooperation and dialogue between them. As Gatari and Albuquerque have pointed out, there is an ever-growing diversity of actors operating on the climate change governance landscape, which increases the complexity of climate governance.

This means that new solutions are necessary. Developed nations need to increase the scale and quality of their financial contributions. In addition, multilateral organisations, including international financial institutions (IFIs), need substantial reform to correct existing structural gaps and inequalities, as well as to better align their operations with the goals of the UNFCCC and its Paris Agreements and the SDGs, especially in terms of supporting the developing world in implementing these frameworks.

The G20 – a political coordination group composed of countries representing 85% of the GDP and 60% of the world’s population, responsible for 80% of the planet’s greenhouse gas emissions – can play a significant role in this regard. The group can improve communication among relevant stakeholders, drawing on its track record of collaboration with multilateral institutions, such as various United Nations agencies, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank. Additionally,

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4. Several organisations, including Oxfam, have questioned donors’ claims to have reached the US$ 100 billion climate finance target, stating that it is an overestimate because it includes projects in which the climate objective has been overstated or provided as loans cited at their face value. “By providing loans rather than grants, these funds are potentially harming rather than helping local communities, as they add to the debt burdens of already heavily indebted countries — even more so in this time of rising interest rates.” See more on: Oxfam. “Rich countries’ failure to honour their climate finance promise threatens negotiations and undermines climate action,” accessed May 27, 2024, [https://www.oxfam.org.uk/media/press-releases/rich-countries-failure-to-honour-their-climate-finance-promise-threatens-negotiations-and-undermines-climate-action/](https://www.oxfam.org.uk/media/press-releases/rich-countries-failure-to-honour-their-climate-finance-promise-threatens-negotiations-and-undermines-climate-action/).


7. These statistics do not reflect the recent admission of the African Union to the G20.
it can foster improved dialogue and the exchange of best practices among its members, as G20 meetings have often paved the way for building consensus in multilateral negotiations in other fora. Over time, the G20 has, therefore, embodied a global governance function.

In terms of membership, the G20 also plays a global governance role by acting as a bridge between developed and developing countries. In 2023, the G20 Troika consisted exclusively of developing nations (Indonesia, India, and Brazil), and this continued into 2024, with Brazil assuming the group’s presidency and remaining in the Troika alongside India and South Africa, the 2025 host of the G20. Therefore, there is a significant window of opportunity to enhance the G20’s role in efforts to promote a profound reform of the current international system, ensuring it is better equipped to develop fairer, more inclusive, and effective responses to contemporary financial, climate, and social challenges.

In fact, these goals are aligned with the motto of the Brazilian G20 presidency, “Building a fair world and a sustainable planet,” and its three announced priorities, namely: (1) Fostering social inclusion and fighting poverty and hunger; (2) Promoting energy transitions and sustainable development in its three dimensions (social, economic, and environmental); and (3) Advancing the reform of global governance institutions.

To help achieve these objectives, Brazil announced the establishment of two G20 task forces – the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty and the Task Force on a Global Mobilization Against Climate Change, as well as an Initiative on Bioeconomy.

Against this backdrop, this policy brief seeks to analyse the existing G20 framework, focusing on its key WGs dedicated to issues relevant to addressing the climate and environmental crisis. The aim is to identify gaps and lessons learned in order to develop recommendations to support Brazil’s presidency ambition of strengthening multilateral efforts to combat climate change and promote sustainable development.

This brief is structured as follows: after this introduction, section two provides a concise historical overview of the evolution of change-related issues within the G20, focusing on the declarations of Heads of State and Government from 2008 to 2023. The third section maps the key topics covered within the scope of the G20 Finance Track’s Sustainable Finance Working Group (SFWG), and the Sherpa Track’s WGs on Environment and Climate Sustainability (ECSWG), and Energy Transitions (ETWG) during the previous G20 Troika. This includes initiatives undertaken during the Indonesian and Indian presidencies, along with the priorities proposed by Brazil. Drawing on gaps and lessons learned from the previous sections, the fourth section offers key recommendations to support Brazil’s G20 presidency goals, especially with regard to fostering a Global Mobilization Against Climate Change.

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2. G20 AND CLIMATE PLEDGES:  
A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Formally created in 1999, the G20 was originally established as a forum for coordinating joint responses to global economic and financial challenges. Initially, it consisted of meetings exclusively between Finance Ministers and Presidents of the Central Banks of each member state. What differentiated the G20 from other multilateral financial coalitions, such as the G8 at the time, was the inclusion of emerging and/or developing economies.

The G20 began broadening its scope in 2008 with the inaugural G20 Summit at the Heads of State and Government level held in Washington D.C. That year marked the division between the Sherpa and Finance Tracks, facilitating the G20’s gradual expansion beyond financial issues. Subsequently, a series of thematic WGs focused on broader global concerns were established, all operating under the umbrella of these two tracks.

Although climate-related issues have featured in the G20 agenda since the Washington D.C. Summit in 2008\(^9\), it was not until 2018 that WGs exclusively dedicated to this matter were inaugurated. During Argentina’s presidency, both the ECSWG and the ETWG Working Groups were founded within the Sherpa Track. That same year, the group first started convening Environment Deputies Ministers (EDM). In 2019, during the Japanese presidency, the inaugural G20 Environment and Energy Ministers’ Ministerial Meeting was held. However, it was only starting from 2021, during the Italian presidency, that the Finance Track established a WG dedicated to discussing climate financing – the SFWG\(^10\).

Alongside the G20 official tracks, climate concerns have also gained increasing prominence in the working agendas of the G20 engagement groups\(^11\). These autonomous collectives consist of civil society (C20), think tanks (T20)\(^12\), the business sector (B20), and scientists (S20), among others, dedicated to developing policy recommendations to be submitted to G20 officials.

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10. The SFWG was preceded by the Green Finance Study Group and the Sustainable Finance Study Group, both in the Finance Track, but with a more limited mandate, mainly focused on knowledge production.

11. As of April 2024, at least 13 G20 engagement groups had been established, namely: C20 (civil society); T20 (think tanks); Y20 (youth); W20 (women); L20 (work); U20 (cities); B20 (business); S20 (science); Startup20 (startups); P20 (parliaments); SAI20 (supreme audit institutions); and the newest J20 (supreme courts) and O20 (oceans). For further information, please access: https://www.g20.org/en/g20-social/engagement-groups.

However, the establishment of such initiatives did not automatically result in climate issues being given political priority in the G20 Leaders’ Declaration. For instance, references to the terms ‘climate,’ ‘climate change’ and their variations\(^{13}\) were rare in these documents until 2020, with mentions becoming more prominent from 2021 onwards. Plataforma CIPÓ monitored the G20 Leaders’ Declaration from 2008 to 2023 and concluded that over the past fifteen years, mentions of the term ‘climate’ and/or ‘climate change’ increased from one mention in 2008 to 48 in 2023. Nevertheless, as the graphic below illustrates, this increase was not steadily distributed over time.

**Graphic 1. References to climate/climate change in the G20 Leaders' Declaration (2008-2023)**

![Bar chart showing the number of references to climate/climate change in the G20 Leaders' Declaration from 2008 to 2023.](image)

As illustrated in graphic 1, the term ‘climate change’ was mentioned broadly for the first time in 2008\(^{14}\). In 2009 and 2013, there was a small increase in mentions, with ‘climate change’ and its variations being addressed 15 and 13 times, respectively. Throughout the period from 2008 to 2020 – excluding the outlier years of 2009 and 2013 – these terms were referenced an average of 4.5 times in the Leaders’ Declaration, varying from one mention in 2008 to 8 in 2012. In 2021, mentions of ‘climate’ and ‘climate change’ skyrocketed, going from 7 in 2020 to 34 in 2021. This pattern persisted in the subsequent years, with 27 mentions in 2022 and 48 mentions in 2023, reaching the highest number since the inaugural G20 Heads of State and Government Summit.

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\(^{13}\) Some variations include ‘climate action,’ ‘climate finance,’ ‘the climate,’ ‘climate mitigation and adaptation’ etc.

To some extent, G20 leaders’ references to climate change reflect the developments occurring within multilateral climate negotiations. For instance, the high number of mentions of climate issues in the September 2009 G20 Leaders’ Declaration can be largely explained by the fact that the highly-anticipated United Nations Climate Change Conference, commonly known as the Copenhagen Summit, was scheduled to take place in December of that same year. In this context, the G20 Pittsburgh Declaration addressed the need for G20 countries to reach an agreement in Copenhagen. In addition, G20 countries committed to collaborate in other forums such as the UNFCCC and the World Bank, and also agreed to phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies and to provide support for the poorest countries in this regard. The 2009 Declaration also recommended the World Bank to strengthen “contributions to financing the transition to a green economy through investment in sustainable clean energy generation and use, energy efficiency and climate resilience.”

The decrease in mentions of climate change in the final declarations of the G20 from 2010 onwards highlights the fact that the integration of this topic into the group’s political priorities was not consistent. This has been influenced by a myriad of simultaneous events, including the lingering effects of the 2008 global economic crisis, the differing priorities set by each G20 presidency, as well as by disagreements in forums such as the UNFCCC. For consensus-based groupings like the G20, reaching concrete commitments often depends on the alignment between the group’s agenda and the priorities of its member states in other multilateral spaces and negotiations. However, even with the signing of the Paris Agreement in 2015, references to climate remained consistently low, with the Leaders’ Declaration mostly addressing the G20 countries’ commitment to implementing the agreement, but without any further elaboration on the subject.

By contrast, the rise in mentions from 2021 onwards could indicate a shift in mentality. The increased number of 34 references made to the terms ‘climate’ and ‘climate change’ in the final declaration was consistent with the priorities of the Italian presidency, whose motto was “People, Planet, Prosperity: The Italian G20 Finance track.”

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Planet, Prosperity. For the first time ever, a Summit Declaration set more concrete objectives for tackling climate change, reaffirming the need for G20 countries to collaborate in the scope of the UNFCCC and particularly the 26th Edition of the Conference of the Parties (COP26), which took place in Glasgow that same year. The document called for more ambitious NDCs and the need to limit global warming to 1.5°C and to achieve the SDGs. Concrete proposals were also made in areas such as circular economy, sustainable finance, and energy transition. The Rome G20 Summit was the first to be hosted by a European country following the adoption of the European Green Deal in 2020, which may have contributed to a more pronounced focus on the subject during Italy’s leadership of the G20.

Under the Indonesian presidency in 2022, the group reaffirmed its commitment to the Paris Agreement, the UNFCCC and the 2030 Agenda. The Bali Declaration expressed the G20 members’ commitment to adopting measures supporting just and affordable energy transitions, implementing the Glasgow Climate Pact and strengthening the 2030 targets of their NDCs. The G20 leaders also called for progress on loss and damage at COP27, where an agreement was reached to establish a fund for loss and damage, celebrated as a victory for developing nations.

The following year, the New Delhi Declaration included a record number of mentions of the terms ‘climate’ and ‘climate change,’ totalling 48 references. The document reassured the commitment of the G20 countries not only to the UNFCCC, the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda, but also adopted a stronger stance on the need for climate financing. It recalled developed countries’ US$ 100 billion target and emphasised the need for multilateral financial institutions to set more ambitious adaptation finance targets.

In conclusion, concerning the climate agenda, the New Delhi Declaration stands out as the most comprehensive since the Washington Summit in 2008. While, on


22. The Glasgow Climate Pact, signed during COP26 in Glasgow, recognized the urge for greater ambition and the need for accelerating adaptation and mitigation actions, as well as the need for phasing down fossil fuels - especially coal, and prioritising efforts on loss and damage. For further information, please access: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2021_10_add1_adv.pdf.


the one hand, this can be attributed in part to the growing international attention to climate concerns, on the other hand, it also reflects the institutionalisation of climate-related frameworks within the G20. Although the Leaders’ Declaration is often the most visible aspect of the group's efforts, throughout each rotating presidency the G20 WGs carry out regular meetings, frequently in consultation with experts and specialised agencies, to identify areas and initiatives where consensus and collective collaboration can be fostered. Numerous G20 WGs and initiatives incorporate climate discussions to varying degrees, including the Sherpa Track’s WGs on Agriculture, Development, Trade and Investment, and Disaster Risk Reduction, as well as the Finance Track’s WGs on Infrastructure and the Framework WG.

The next section is dedicated to analysing the operation during the presidencies of the previous G20 Troika, consisting of Indonesia, India, and Brazil, of three frameworks that incorporate climate issues at the core of their working agenda: the SFWG, the ECSWG, and the ETWG.

### 3. THE CLIMATE CRISIS AND G20 WORKING GROUPS

The G20 Leaders’ Declaration is the outcome of an extensive series of meetings and negotiations that encompass a wide range of thematic issues. However, as the G20 operates on a consensus basis, certain topics are intensively discussed within its various WGs and Task Forces, yet they frequently remain excluded from the Summit’s final declaration.

Therefore, to provide a more comprehensive assessment of the political weight given to climate within the G20, this section will complement the analysis of the past G20 Leaders’ Declaration by examining three climate-related WGs dedicated to finding solutions to the climate crisis.

#### 3.1 FINANCE TRACK: SUSTAINABLE FINANCE WORKING GROUP (SFWG)

The SFWG was established in 2021 during the Italian presidency, with its secretariat subsequently overseen by the Sustainable Finance Hub of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), an initiative aimed at accelerating public and private financing for the SDGs. One of the SFWG’s first outputs was a G20 Sustainable Finance Roadmap. Launched in the same year that the WG was created, the Roadmap acknowledged the need for strengthening the capacity of International Organisations (IOs), Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) and IFIs, to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement. The document also outlined several recommendations for the global financial architecture. For instance,

Action 14 emphasises that MDBs, IFIs and other IOs should “raise their ambition on climate action,” while Action 15 calls for MDBs to assist countries “in aligning domestic financial flows with the goals of the Paris Agreement.”

In 2022, during the Indonesian presidency, the SFWG focused on three main priorities: (1) Developing a framework for transition finance and improving the credibility of financial institution commitments; (2) Scaling up sustainable finance instruments, with a focus on accessibility and affordability; and (3) Discussing policy levers that incentivize financing and investments supporting the transition. The work conducted by the SFWG throughout the year resulted in the launch of the “G20 Sustainable Finance Report” and the development of a “Transition Finance Framework.” This framework aims to assist financial institutions in formulating policies for transition, climate mitigation, and adaptation.

Against this backdrop, India assumed the G20 presidency. In 2023, the SFWG primarily focused on three areas: (1) Mechanisms for mobilisation of timely and adequate resources for climate finance; (2) Enabling finance for the SDGs; and (3) Capacity building of the ecosystem for financing toward sustainable development.

The key outcomes of the SFWG’s efforts during the Indian presidency included the “2023 Sustainable Finance Report - Volume I,” which provides a series of political recommendations aimed at accomplishing the three WG priorities, as well as a Progress Report on the G20 Sustainable Finance Roadmap. Additionally, the “2023 Sustainable Finance Report - Volume II” was produced, featuring a comprehensive compendium of case studies for financing SDGs. Furthermore, the Technical Assistance Action Plan (TAAP) was developed with the objective of enhancing capacity building to achieve the SDGs and bolster support for transitional finance.

The TAAP recognises the importance of fostering technical collaboration and coordination across relevant institutions, such as IOs, MDBs, and Development Finance Institutions (DFIs). As a multi-year framework, it is scheduled for periodic review, initially covering the short term from 2023 to 2025, and subsequently, the short-to-medium term. The TAAP guiding document invites institutions to submit ideas to the G20 for further advancement of the action plan, although it does not provide additional clarification on how this could materialise.

29. The Transition Finance Framework consists of 22 principles spanning across 5 pillars, which are as follows: (1) Approaches to Identification of Transitional Activities and Investments; (2) Reporting of Information on Transition Activities and Investments; (3) Transition-Related Financial Instruments; (4) Designing Policy Measures, and (5) Assessing and Mitigating Negative Social and Economic Impacts of Transition Activities and Investments. For further information, please access: https://g20sfwg.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/TFF-2-pager-digital.pdf.
During the Brazilian presidency, the SFWG issue note underscores the significance of maintaining adherence to the Sustainable Finance Roadmap, which commences a new triennium in 2024. Brazil has delineated four primary priorities for the SFWG: (1) Optimising access to international environment and climate funds; (2) Advancing credible, robust, and just transition plans; (3) Implementing sustainability reporting requirements that work for all, including Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and Emerging Markets and Developing Economies (EMDEs); and (4) Financing Nature-Based Solutions (NbS)\textsuperscript{32}.

As a result of the work conducted by the SFWG during the year, the Brazilian presidency anticipates four deliverables: i) An independent review of the functioning of international environmental and climate funds; ii) A set of recommendations on how to assess and mitigate negative social and economic impacts of transition activities and investments; iii) Recommendations on how to implement just sustainability reporting; and iv) A report of the evaluation of blended finance instruments and recommendations about NbS\textsuperscript{33}.

Considering the agenda adopted by the SFWG during the Indonesian, Indian, and Brazilian presidencies, Table 1 below summarises the WG’s main outputs and initiatives.

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<th>Agenda Topics</th>
<th>Relevant Documents and Initiatives</th>
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<tr>
<td>Indonesian Presidency\textsuperscript{34} (2022)</td>
<td>G20 2022 Sustainable Finance Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Developing a framework for transition finance and improving the credibility of financial institution commitments</td>
<td>G20 Transitional Finance Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Scaling up sustainable finance instruments, with a focus on accessibility and affordability</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Discussing policy levers that incentivize financing and investments that support the transition</td>
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<th>Agenda Topics</th>
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<td><strong>Indian Presidency</strong>&lt;sup&gt;35 36 37 (2023)&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td><strong>Mechanisms for Mobilisation of Timely and Adequate Resources for Climate Finance</strong>&lt;br&gt;• Policy measures and financial instruments for catalysing the rapid development and deployment of green and low-carbon technologies <strong>Enabling Finance for the Sustainable Development Goals: Analytical Framework for SDG-aligned Finance</strong>&lt;br&gt;• Scaling-up the adoption of social impact investment instruments&lt;br&gt;• Improving Nature-related Data and Reporting <strong>Capacity Building of the Ecosystem for Financing toward Sustainable Development</strong>&lt;br&gt;• Overcoming data-related barriers to climate investments</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Brazilian Presidency</strong>&lt;sup&gt;38&lt;/sup&gt; (2024)</td>
<td>• Optimising access to international environment and climate funds&lt;br&gt;• Advancing credible, robust, and just transition plans&lt;br&gt;• Implementing sustainability reporting requirements that work for all, including SMEs and EMDEs&lt;br&gt;• Financing Nature-Based Solutions</td>
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**Source:** Plataforma CIPÓ based on referenced G20 documents


3.2. SHERPA TRACK: ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE SUSTAINABILITY WORKING GROUP (ECSWG)

Since its establishment in 2018, the ECSWG has initiated multiple efforts focusing on the intersection of climate and global governance. In 2020, during the Saudi presidency, it launched the Global Land Initiative (GLI)\(^{39}\), with its coordination office housed within the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD). The initiative aims to achieve a 50% reduction in the world’s degraded land by 2040\(^{40}\).

During the Indonesian presidency in 2022, cooperation between the ECSWG and other global governance fora was apparent. In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and the war between Russia and Ukraine, the G20 Environment and Climate Ministers’ Meeting, held in August 2022, emphasised the convergence between multiple climate, health, and geopolitical crises. The main topics of the meeting were: (1) Supporting more sustainable recovery; (2) Enhancing land and sea-based actions to support environment protection and climate objectives; and (3) Enhancing resource mobilisation to support environment protection and climate objectives\(^{41}\).

In the same year, the ECSWG conducted studies in collaboration with UNDP and UNICEF, producing documents such as the “Innovative Finance Frameworks towards Low GHG Emission and Climate Resilience Future”\(^{42}\) and the “Study on The Role Of Mitigation-Adaptation Co-Benefits For Creating A More Resilient Future For All”\(^{43}\). In this regard, cooperation between UN bodies and the Indonesian presidency played a key role in generating several studies that formed the basis of the final declaration of the Environment and Climate Ministers’ Meeting.

In 2023, during the Indian presidency, the ECSWG outlined three priority topics: (1) Arresting Land Degradation, Accelerating Ecosystem Restoration, and Enriching

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39. While the GLI and its Roadmap serve as notable instances of G20 policies that have been institutionalised and put into practice through the UN System, their adherence remains voluntary, imposing a challenge in achieving the proposed goal.


43. Cambridge Econometrics; UNICEF; GIZ. *Study on the Role of Mitigation-Adaptation Co-benefits for Creating a More Resilient Future for All*. (Indonesia, Climate Sustainability Working Group, 2022), [https://www.unicef.org/indonesia/media/17201/file/Study%20on%20The%20Role%20of%20Mitigation-Adaptation%20Co-Benefits%20For%20Creating%20A%20More%20Resilient%20Future%20For%20All.pdf](https://www.unicef.org/indonesia/media/17201/file/Study%20on%20The%20Role%20of%20Mitigation-Adaptation%20Co-Benefits%20For%20Creating%20A%20More%20Resilient%20Future%20For%20All.pdf).
Biodiversity; (2) Promoting a Sustainable and Climate Resilient Blue Economy; and (3) Encouraging Resource Efficiency and Circular Economy. The first priority resulted in the “Gandhinagar Implementation Roadmap and the Gandhinagar Information Platform,” designed to foster collaboration among participating nations. Their objective is to accelerate efforts for land restoration and strengthen the G20 GLI. The second priority, in turn, culminated in a technical study outlining nine principles to advance a sustainable and resilient blue economy, as well as the “Chennai Principles for a Blue Ocean-based Economy.” Meanwhile, the ECSWG’s third priority culminated in the launch of a “Resource Efficiency and Circular Economy Industry Coalition (RECEIC),” involving governments, communities, and the private sector.

During the Brazilian presidency, the ESCWG has emphasised the gaps between commitments made in environmental regimes and their actual implementation, stressing the need for renewed international cooperation. In this context, the ESCWG’s issue note identifies the G20 as a preferred forum to enhance trust among countries, reaffirm the significance of multilateral processes, and uphold the legitimacy of negotiated decisions without duplicating or overlapping efforts. Building upon the priorities established by the Indian presidency, in 2024, the ESCWG’s work centres around four key priorities: (1) Emergency and Preventive Adaptation to Extreme Climate Events; (2) Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES); (3) Oceans; and (4) Waste and Circular Economy. As outlined in the table below, the Brazilian presidency envisions at least thirteen outcomes related to these priorities.

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44. Government of India. *Accelerating The Transition To A Sustainable And Resilient Blue Economy Presidency Document* (India, Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, 2023), [http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2023/G20_ECSWG-Technical_Study_on_Accelerating_the_Transition_to_a_Sustainable_and_Resilient_Blue_Economy.pdf](http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2023/G20_ECSWG-Technical_Study_on_Accelerating_the_Transition_to_a_Sustainable_and_Resilient_Blue_Economy.pdf).


49. All the outcomes envisioned for the ECSWG under the G20 Brazilian presidency are listed in Table 2.
Table 2. Sherpa Track - Environment and Climate Sustainability Working Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agenda Topics</th>
<th>Relevant Documents and Initiatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian Presidency\textsuperscript{50} (2022)</td>
<td>• Study on Stocktaking Economic, Social, and Environmental Impacts of Sustainable Recovery, including Impacts on NDC Implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Supporting a more sustainable economic recovery</td>
<td>• Study on the role of mitigation-adaptation co-benefits for creating a more resilient future for all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Enhancing land and sea-based actions to support environment protection and climate objectives</td>
<td>• Study on Strengthening Action and Partnership for Sustainable Ocean Initiatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Enhancing resource mobilisation to support environment protection and climate objectives</td>
<td>• Study on Promoting Ocean-based Solutions to Climate Change Through Enhanced Cooperation in Science, Research, and Innovation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Arresting Land Degradation, Accelerating Ecosystem Restoration, and Enriching Biodiversity</td>
<td>• Study on Accelerating NDC Implementation and Sustainable Transition Towards Low GHG Emission and Climate Resilience Future through Utilizing Economic Value of Carbon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting a Sustainable and Climate Resilient Blue Economy</td>
<td>• Gandhinagar Implementation Roadmap And Gandhinagar Information Platform For Global Land Initiative (GLI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Addressing Marine Litter for a Sustainable Blue Economy</td>
<td>• Technical Study on Accelerating the Transition to a Sustainable and Resilient Blue Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Coastal and Marine Spatial Planning for a Sustainable Blue Economy</td>
<td>• Chennai Principles for a Blue Ocean-based Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Conservation of Marine Ecosystems</td>
<td>• Resource Efficiency and Circular Economy Industry Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encouraging Resource Efficiency and Circular Economy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{51} G20. Outcome Document and Chair’s Summary - G20 Environment and Climate Ministers’ Meeting (India, Outcome Document and Chair’s Summary, 2023), https://www.env.go.jp/content/000150578.pdf.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agenda Topics</th>
<th>Relevant Documents and Initiatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Emergency and preventive adaptation to extreme climate events</td>
<td>Planned deliverables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Payments for ecosystem services</td>
<td>• Principles for assessing climate risks and vulnerabilities at the country level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Oceans</td>
<td>• G20 Knowledge Exchange Arrangement on adaptation planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Waste and circular economy</td>
<td>• G20 framework for national and international investments in adaptation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• G20 principles with a view to creating innovative instruments that make it possible to finance nature conservation and ecosystemic services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Methodology to monitor and evaluate the impact of the above principles</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Toolkit to support countries in the development of Marine Spatial Planning (MSP) to best manage marine areas</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Mapping of all ocean-based uses and activities, including those that are underrepresented and under-mapped, such as local fisheries and community-based tourism or aquaculture</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Increase creation and implementation of marine protected areas (MPAs) and other area-based conservation measures</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Contribution to the elaboration of countries’ NDCs, including conservation of ocean and coastal zones</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Promote ratification and mobilize resources for the implementation of the Agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• G20 Inventory on technical and technological solutions for waste reduction and management and circular economy</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Compendium of good practices and successful experiences of the G20 aimed at the promotion and implementation of policies that create economic instruments and credits to encourage recycling actions, improvements in the rights of workers, including collectors, in the recycling and waste management sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Principles for an Inclusive Circular Economy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Plataforma CIPÓ based on referenced G20 documents

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3.3 SHERPA TRACK: ENERGY TRANSITIONS WORKING GROUP (ETWG)

Established in 2018, during the Argentinian presidency, the ETWG has become, alongside the Environment and Climate Sustainability Working Group, one of the most active instances within the G20. Building on the previous efforts of the Saudi presidency, in 2021 the Italian presidency devised the Executive Note titled “Energy Poverty: Addressing the intersection of Sustainable Development Goal 7 (SDG7), Development and Resilience”.

Developed collaboratively with multiple International Organizations (IOs) and research centres, the note aimed to propose a voluntary action plan to tackle energy poverty.

In 2022, the Indonesian presidency put forward three core priorities for the ETWG: (1) Securing energy accessibility; (2) Scaling up smart and clean energy technologies; and (3) Advancing clean energy financing. Initiatives carried out under the scope of these priorities formed the basis for a broad framework towards accelerating “clean, sustainable, just, affordable, and inclusive energy transitions”:

The Bali Energy Transitions Roadmap through 2030, also referred to as the “Bali Roadmap.”

In addition to introducing principles and actions for accelerating G20 members’ energy transitions, the Bali Roadmap introduced a Troika Action Plan aimed at guiding G20 countries to achieve the Roadmap’s milestones by 2030. It also recommended the establishment of an annual Bali Energy Transitions Stocktake, which would rely on self-reviews by members, alongside annual reports from IOs involved in the Roadmap’s initiatives.

The Bali Roadmap adopted the same three priorities set by the Indonesian presidency for the ETWG and emphasises the need for collaboration with UN Bodies, the International Energy Agency (IEA) and MDBs. Finally, it highlighted the importance of enhanced dialogue between the ETWG and other G20 Working Groups, particularly the SFWG.

Under the Indian presidency, the ETWG operated under six main priorities: (1) Energy Security and Diversified Supply Chains; (2) Universal Energy Access and Just, Affordable and Inclusive Energy Transition Pathways; (3) Energy Efficiency and Responsible Consumption; (4)


55. Desk-research in public sources did not identify any indication that such proposed Energy Transitions Stocktake and review mechanisms have been put in place.


In 2024, the issue note from the ETWG crafted by the Brazilian presidency acknowledges the outcomes achieved by previous presidencies and takes into consideration the Bali Roadmap. Additionally, the document highlights the social dimension of energy transitions and emphasises how this focus has the potential to contribute to the implementation of the SDGs. However, the issue note does not specify the extent to which the recent initiatives proposed for the WG in 2024 are an extension of the Roadmap, nor does it contain any reference to the Troika Action Plan initiated in 2022. This demonstrates the fragmentation of the G20 agenda and the frequent lack of continuity between initiatives launched by preceding presidencies.

Under its presidency, Brazil has set three new priorities for the ETWG: (1) Accelerating Financing for Energy Transitions; (2) The Social Dimension of Energy Transitions; and (3) Innovative Perspectives on Sustainable Fuels. Regarding the first priority, it is expected that it will lead to the creation of a Centre for Policy Advice and Analysis on Clean Energy Investment and Finance for EMDEs; the launch of a Global Coalition for Energy Planning; and a G20 commitment to financing energy transitions in EMDEs. The second thematic priority seeks to foster an assessment of the definitions of just and inclusive energy transitions and a pledge from G20 countries to fund universal and improved access to clean cooking. Finally, the third priority should deliver a Roadmap with guidelines for accelerating market development for new sustainable fuels; a policy blueprint on good practices for sustainable sourcing; a policy paper on ethanol’s role in the net-zero scenario and an updated version of the “Green Ethanol Book.” Additionally, two high-level events are planned: a High-Level Meeting on de-risking investments in EMDEs’ Clean Energy Financing and a High-Level debate on performance-based sustainability assessments and frameworks.

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58. Under the second priority, the Indian Presidency prepared the “Voluntary Action Plan for Lowering the Cost of Finance for Energy Transitions.” Article 4 of this Plan encourages IFIs and MDBs to develop new governance frameworks to lower costs of new energy sources, a crucial step to ending dependence on fossil fuels. See more on: G20. Voluntary Action Plan for Lowering the Cost of Finance for Energy Transitions (India, Energy Transitions Working Group, 2023), Annex C.

Table 3 summarises the ETWG’s main agenda and outputs during the Indonesian, Indian, and Brazilian G20 presidencies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agenda Topics</th>
<th>Relevant Documents and Initiatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Securing energy accessibility</td>
<td>Bali Energy Transitions Roadmap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scaling up smart and clean energy technologies</td>
<td>Stocktake on Access, Technology, and Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advancing energy financing</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| Indonesian Presidency of Indonesia (2022)          | G20 High-Level Voluntary Principles on Hydrogen                        |
|                                                    | Voluntary High-Level Principles for Collaboration on Critical Minerals for Energy Transitions |
|                                                    | Voluntary Action Plan on Doubling the Global Rate of Energy Efficiency Improvement by 2030 |
|                                                    | Voluntary Action Plan for Lowering the Cost of Finance for Energy Transitions |
|                                                    | Voluntary Action Plan for Promoting Renewable Energy to Accelerate Universal Energy Access |
| Energy Security and diversified supply chains      |                                                                        |
| Universal Energy Access and Just, Affordable, and Inclusive Energy Transition Pathways |                                                        |
| Energy Efficiency and Responsible Consumption      |                                                                        |
| Addressing Technology Gaps for Energy Transitions  |                                                                        |
| Fuels for the Future                               |                                                                        |
| Access to Low-Cost Financing for Energy Transitions|                                                                        |

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agenda Topics</th>
<th>Relevant Documents and Initiatives</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazilian Presidency[62] (2024)</td>
<td>Planned deliverables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Accelerating Financing for Energy Transitions, especially in Emerging Markets and Developing Economies</td>
<td>• Centre for Policy Advice and Analysis on Clean Energy Investment and Finance for EMDEs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Social Dimension of the energy transition</td>
<td>• Global Coalition for Energy Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Innovative perspectives on sustainable fuels</td>
<td>• Financing the Energy Transitions in EMDEs’ pledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• High Level Meeting on de-risking investments in EMDEs’ Clean Energy Financing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Assessment of definitions of just and inclusive energy transition and what gaps these definitions may have</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Pledge from G20 countries to fund universal and improved access to clean cooking</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Multistakeholder Dialogue on Principles for Promoting a Just and Inclusive Energy Transition in EMDEs that would include representatives from civil society and academia to incorporate local perspectives into energy planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Roadmap with policy guidelines for accelerating market development for new sustainable fuels</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Policy blueprint on good practices for sustainable sourcing: quantification and sustainability governance</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Policy paper: “Ethanol’s role in the Net-Zero Scenario: present and future”</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Updated version of the “Green Ethanol Book” as a Global Biofuels Alliance deliverable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• High-level debate: Seeking consensus on performance-based sustainability assessments and frameworks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Plataforma CIPÓ based on referenced G20 documents

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4. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The analysis of the G20 Leaders’ Declaration since its inception, along with the mapping of the working agenda and outputs of the WGs on Sustainable Finance, Environment and Climate Sustainability, and Energy Transitions, demonstrates the G20’s significant effort to integrate climate concerns into its political priorities and technical frameworks over time.

This trend has gained significant momentum since Brazil took over the G20 presidency and established a temporary Task Force on Global Mobilisation Against Climate Change (TF-CLIMA), involving both the Sherpa and Finance Tracks. Its objectives include: (1) Supporting developing countries in building institutional capacity to design and implement robust national transition plans, while also mobilising resources to foster the implementation of such plans, and tackling barriers to finance access and other negative externalities; (2) Setting principles and priorities for accelerating structural changes in the financial sector, with a view to its full alignment with Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement, as a complement to public funding.

In addition to a temporary Task Force dedicated to the topic, an analysis of the issue notes of the G20 WGs under the Finance and Sherpa Tracks indicates that during the Brazilian presidency, at least fifteen of the twenty-two existing WGs address climate, sustainability, and just transition-related issues. For instance, the “imperative of a just transition in the face of the digital and energy transformations” is one of the priorities of the Development Working Group, while promoting open innovation for the decarbonisation of the economy is at the core of the agenda of the Research and Innovation Working Group. Sustainable agrifood systems, climate resilient infrastructure, and climate justice are key concerns for the Working Groups on Agriculture, Infrastructure, and Women’s Empowerment, respectively.

Despite this effort to mainstream climate and sustainability considerations within its institutional frameworks and the high number of climate-related commitments made in the G20 summits and their respective declarations, the G20 still lacks transparency and accountability, hindering effective oversight of its working agenda.

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63. Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement states the following: “This Agreement, in enhancing the implementation of the Convention, including its objective, aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty, including by [...] (C) Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development.”

64. The G20 presidency issue notes can be found at: https://www.g20.org/pt-br/documentos.

65. G20 Working Groups currently addressing climate and sustainability concerns are the following: (1) Sherpa Track: Agriculture; Anti-corruption; Development; Disaster Risk and Reduction; Employment; Energy; Environment and Climate Sustainability; Health; Research and Innovation; Trade and Investment; and Women’s Empowerment; (2) Finance Track: Framework; Infrastructure, International Financial Architecture; and (3) Sustainable Finance.
and the tracking of the implementation of the agreed pledges. These challenges are partly attributed to the short and temporary nature of each G20 presidency, resulting in regular and often drastic changes in the priorities established each year, as demonstrated in section three of this policy brief.

For the academic, think tanks, civil society, and advocacy communities, the absence of a centralised database makes it challenging to monitor and demand accountability for a multitude of action plans, roadmaps, declarations, and voluntary commitments. This fragmentation and fast-changing thematic priorities for each G20 WG creates obstacles for developing strategies to ensure that G20 climate efforts are aligned with and reinforce the priorities of legally binding commitments established by other climate governance frameworks, such as the UNFCCC and its Paris Agreement. This contributes to a scenario in which G20 countries’ policies remain largely inconsistent with the 1.5°C target, with their national climate policies being considered insufficient - in some cases, critically or highly insufficient - to guarantee the goals of the Paris Agreement66.

To make matters worse, the opacity in terms of access to information and the weak coordination between the different G20 WGs dealing with climate-relevant issues can contribute to certain crucial topics being overlooked or receiving insufficient attention. The mapping conducted as part of this study suggests that topics such as financing for climate adaptation and loss and damage, which are of extreme relevance for the Global South, have been neglected in comparison to the focus given to the mitigation agenda.

Against this backdrop, this policy provides the following recommendations to enhance the G20’s ability to promote climate action:

1. ESTABLISHING A PERMANENT G20 BODY FOR CLIMATE ACTION

While affording the group a high degree of flexibility, which can be advantageous especially in times of crisis requiring rapid responses, the absence of a permanent secretariat makes the continuity of G20 agenda priorities highly dependent on the vision and political will of each presidency, as well as on the level of coordination among the countries composing the Troika. This discontinuity and lack of complementarity between the various policy proposals developed

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66. This data was extracted from the analysis of individual country profiles and the European Union profile in the Climate Action Tracker (CAT) database. African Union countries were not included in the assessment, while the European Union was included as a bloc. The CAT’s overall rating considers countries’ policies and actions, NDC targets against modelled domestic pathways, and NDC targets against fair share and climate finance (if applicable). The overall rating of the G20 members is as follows: Argentina: critically insufficient; Australia: insufficient; Brazil: insufficient; Canada: highly insufficient; China: highly insufficient; European Union: insufficient; India: highly insufficient; Indonesia: critically insufficient; Japan: insufficient; Mexico: critically insufficient; South Korea: highly insufficient; Saudi Arabia: critically insufficient; South Africa: insufficient; Russia: critically insufficient; Turkey: critically insufficient; United Kingdom: insufficient; and United States: insufficient. For further information, please see: https://climateactiontracker.org/.
In this context, the G20 should build upon the work of the temporary TF-CLIMA created by the Brazilian G20 presidency to establish a permanent body for climate action that encompasses both the Sherpa and Finance Tracks. The mandate of this proposed framework could include, among other priorities defined by G20 members:

- Mainstreaming climate throughout the working agenda of all G20 WGs to ensure a systematic integration of climate considerations into the strategies and priorities advanced by the G20 Sherpa and Finance Tracks;
- Coordinating, establishing dialogue, and promoting complementarity between Sherpa and Finance Tracks’ WGs addressing climate-related issues;
- Monitoring the implementation of climate-related commitments established in the G20 Leaders’ Declaration, and publicly reporting findings on an annual basis to improve transparency and accountability of the G20 climate pledges;
- Establishing regular and predictable dialogue with G20 engagement groups addressing climate-relevant issues, such as the T20 and the C20, to formally gather inputs and recommendations from civil society, think tanks, and other relevant groups in a more structured manner, moving away from sporadic and ad hoc approaches.

2. ALIGNING THE G20 CLIMATE AGENDA AND ITS INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE REFORM EFFORTS WITH THE UNFCCC’S PRIORITIES

At the initial G20 summits, there was “a divide between those countries that emphasised the group’s role in climate action and those which insisted that the UNFCCC was the appropriate forum to debate climate action. Despite the growing incorporation of the climate agenda in the G20 discussions, as illustrated in this policy brief, certain G20 countries remain concerned about potential overlaps or

contradictions between the group’s climate agenda and the priorities negotiated in the scope of the Climate Convention.

It is therefore urgent to promote greater synergies and complementarity between the G20 climate-relevant WGs and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Paris Agreement. This could prevent the duplication of efforts and, instead, enable the G20 to effectively contribute to the implementation of the principles and priorities of the UNFCCC and its Paris Agreement, especially with regard to the mobilisation of the means of implementation.

Such an alignment can be advanced – preferably by the above recommended permanent G20 climate body – in two principal ways, such as by:

• Creating a regular channel of communication and dialogue between the G20 Troika and the UNFCCC’s Conference of the Parties’ Presidencies Troika to ensure robust and continuous G20 support for COP Presidencies’ efforts to advance the Roadmap to Mission 1.5°C, a mechanism designed “to significantly enhance international cooperation and the international enabling environment to stimulate ambition in the next round of nationally determined contributions, with a view to enhancing action and implementation over this critical decade and keeping 1.5°C within reach.”

• Promoting a regular channel of dialogue and information exchange meetings between the G20, international financial institutions, and the UNFCCC Secretariat to:

  a) explore and advance the G20 and IFI’s role in mobilising the means of implementation in the form of finance, capacity building, and technology transfer to promote the effective implementation of the UNFCCC and its Paris Agreement;

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70. The G20 should not only focus on increasing the quantity of climate finance but also, as emphasised by Mukund and Kabra, strive to enhance the qualitative aspects of these financial flows. For more on this, please see: Mukund, Aditi; Kabra, Namrata. “Towards Inclusive Climate Multilateralism: An Opportunity for the G20” Policy brief presented at the T20 Task Force 7: Towards Reformed Multilateralism: Transforming Global Institutions and Frameworks, 2023, https://www.global-solutions-initiative.org/task_force/tf-7-towards-reformed-multilateralism-transforming-global-institutions-and-frameworks/.
b) ensure the alignment of all G20 climate-relevant WGs’ agenda, outputs, commitments, and international financial architecture reform efforts with the principles enshrined in the UNFCCC, especially the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC);

c) promote a greater balance within the G20’s climate-related work, placing increased attention on traditionally overlooked areas of the UNFCCC agenda, such as climate adaptation and loss and damage.
ABOUT PLATAFORMA CIPÓ

Plataforma CIPÓ (www.plataformacipo.org) is an independent, non-profit, women-led think tank dedicated to issues of climate, sustainable development and global governance reform from Latin American and Global South perspectives. CIPÓ supports local and national governments, international organizations and civil society and private sector entities in developing effective responses to the emerging challenges of the climate crisis.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Alessandra Beber Castilho is an associate researcher at Plataforma CIPÓ. She holds a joint PhD in International Relations from the Institute of International Relations at the University of São Paulo and King’s College London, as well as a master’s degree in International Relations from the State University of Rio de Janeiro.

Maiara Folly is the Executive Director and Co-founder of Plataforma CIPÓ. Folly obtained a master’s degree from the Department of International Development at the University of Oxford and a bachelor’s degree in International Relations from the Pontifical Catholic University (PUC) in Rio de Janeiro.

Marianna Albuquerque is a tenured professor at the Institute of International Relations and Defense at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (IRID-UFRJ). She holds a post-doctorate in Military Sciences at the Army Command and General Staff College (ECEME), a PhD in Political Science from the Institute of Social and Political Studies at UERJ (IESP/UERJ) and a Master’s degree in Political Science from the same institution.

Beatriz Mattos is a Research Coordinator at Plataforma CIPÓ. She holds a PhD in International Relations from the Pontifical Catholic University in Rio de Janeiro and a Master’s degree in International Relations and Political Science from the Instituto Universitário de Pesquisa do Rio de Janeiro at Candido Mendes University.